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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT
All parties in the district court are listed on the caption of this case.
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-l 03(2)0) and
the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3. The Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction, but this appeal was transferred to the Court from the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 42, Ut. R. of App. Pro. The district court entered its
final order in Federated Capital Co,p. v. Shaw, Case No. 139910356, on June 29, 2014
(R. at 434.), and Federated Capital Corporation ("Federated") filed a Notice of Appeal on
July 28, 2014. (R. at 446.)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federated appeals thedistrictcourt'sgrantofsummary Judgment. Summary judgment
~

is appropriate when the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Federated Capital Corp.

v. Libby, 2016 UT 41, 17, 384 P.3d 221. Because a summary judgment challenge presents
only legal issues, the court reviews the grant of summary judgment for correctness. Id. This
case also presents issues of statutory interpretation which are also reviewed for correctness.

Id. There are three parts to Federated's appeal.
Issue No. One- Waiver. The first issue is based on Federated's misleading statement

7
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of fact that Mr. Shaw did not set forth the specific statute of limitation in his answer. Thus,
Federated concludes that he waived the defense. Federated misleads the Court by stating that
"Shaw filed an Answer and raised as his fomth defense, [a]s an affirmative defense, the
defendant alleges that the plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations." Fed.
Brief, at 6. However, Mr. Shaw's answer specifically alleges "[a]s an affirmative defense,
the defendant alleges that the claims of the plaintiff are barred by the statute of limitations,
which may be the four year limitations period of the Pennsylvania statute for written
contracts." (R. at 21.) Thus, this issue raised for the first time on appeal is simply without
merit and should be summarily rejected.
Assuming that Federated desires to continue to waste the Court's time and resources
with this issue, Mr. Shaw must address the following issues. Did the trial court commit plain
error when it granted Mr. Shaw's motion for summary judgment dismissing Federated' s case
when: 1) the application of the Pennsylvania four year statute of limitations was the basis of
the court's decision and this issue was fully briefed and argued by the parties in the summary
judgment proceedings; and 2) Mr. Shaw specifically alleged in his answer "[a]s an
affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that the claims of the plaintiff are barred by the
statute of limitations, which may be the four year limitations period of the Pennsylvania
statute for written contracts?" (R. at 21.) At no time during the proceedings before the trial

~

court did Federated argue or bring to the court's attention its argument based on this material
misstatement of fact. See Federated Memorandum in Opposition to summary judgment,
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~

Exhibit "A" to Addendum. (R. at 120-128.) Encompassed in this issue are the following
sub-issues:
1.

Could Mr. Shaw also raise the identity of the specific limitation statute by motion?

2.

Did Federated have notice of the basis of his defense and was it given the opportunity
to defend?

3.

Did Federated take full advantage of the oppmtunity and consent to litigation of the
issue on the merits?

4.

Did Federated fail to preserve its argument made in this appeal?

5.

Did the trial court commit plain error when Mr. Shaw specifically identified the
Pennsylvania four year limitation period for written contracts?

6.

If Mr. Shaw failed to identify the specific statute of limitations in his answer, did the
trial court commit plain error by not reviewing all of the pleadings in this matter
including Mr. Shaw's answer and in light of the fact that Federated's counsel failed
to mention in any of Federated's pleadings the defense to the statute oflimitations it
now raises on appeal?

7.

Did Federated's counsel invite error by the trial court by making no mention of the
defense that Federated now makes on appeal?
The standard of review for these issues is correctness, but since the issues are "highly

fact sensitive" the trial court is granted a "fairly broad measure of discretion" under the facts
in this case. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Financial, Inc., 1999 UT 13,iJ8, 974 P.2d 288.

Issue No. Two - Where the cause of action arises.
This case presents the issue of whether the Court should rule consistent with over 100
years of Utah Supreme Court precedent that, for purposes of interpreting the Utah borrowing
statute, the cause of action arises where performance under the contract was to be made.

9
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Federated did not argue to the trial court that the choice oflaw provision required that
its cause of action arise in Utah. It, thereby, waived and failed to preserve the argument
which is made for the first time on appeal. By not considering Federated's argument, the trial
court did not commit plain error and Federated's counsel invited error by failing to make the
argument. The standard of review is correctness. Libby, at ,r 7.

Issue No. Three - Mr. Shaw's place of performance did not change to Utah.
Gk/

Federated argues that Mr. Shaw offered payments to its predecessor in interest,
Advanta, in Utah. It concludes that by such offer, the place of performance changed to Utah,
making its six year statute oflimitations applicable and trumping the Utah borrowing statute
which would have required application of the Pennsylvania four year limitations period. In
making this argument, Federated misstates the obvious facts that are in the operative
documents and ignores the most important provision of the Advanta credit card agreement
upon which the trial court relied.
Federated alleges that "Shaw called the Salt Lake City, UT office to make payment
via telephone." Fed. Brief at 9. It relies on a monthly statement showing an electronic
payment made over the Internet from Mr. Shaw's place of residence, Texas. The entry on the
monthly statement continues, "Phone Pymt Svc Fee - Col Salt Lake City, Utah $12.00." Id.
The payment was not made in Utah, it was sent over the Internet from Mr. Shaw at his Texas
residence. Advanta charged the fee in Utah.
These facts, however, are irrelevant. In its citation of various provisions of the credit

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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~

card agreement in its statement of facts, Federated fails to tell the Court that paragraph six
of the credit card agreement contained the provision that "[p]ayments tendered to and
accepted by us [Advanta] or our agent at a location other than the address stated on your
~

periodic billing statement are not effective until received by us at the address specified." [
Emphasis added.] (R. 48, 62 (top of page) & 113), Exhibit "B" to Addendum. All of the
periodic billing statements indicate "Make Payment to: Advanta Bank Corp, P.O. Box 8088,
Philadelphia, Pa 19101-8088." (R. at 67.) Exhibit "C" to Addendum. The trial court relied
on this language in its decision (R. at 400.) Exhibit "D" to Addendum. Was that reliance
reasonable in a summary judgment proceeding?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations are
determinative of this appeal or of central importance to the appeal:

Issue No. One - Waiver.
1.

Rule 8(b), ( c) & (f) URCP;

2.

Rule 9(1) URCP;

3.

Rule 12(b) & (h) URCP;

4.

Rule l 5(b) URCP;

Issue No. Two - Where the cause of action arises.

~

1.

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-103.

2.

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8).
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Issue No. Three - Mr. Shaw's place of performance did not change to Utah.

1.

Rule 56 URCP.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the case.
Federated sued Mr. Shaw alleging that he owed Advanta Bank Corporation

("Advanta") on a credit card account. (R. at 1-5.) Federated alleged that Advanta assigned
the account to it. Id at 2. Mr. Shaw answered Federated's complaint alleging "[a]s an
affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that the claims of the plaintiff are barred by the
statute of limitations, which may be the four year limitations period of the Pennsylvania
statute for written contracts." (R. at 21.) Mr. Shaw moved for summary judgment. (R. at 44.)
He argued that the Pennsylvania four year limitation period controlled and it barred
Federated's suit. (R. at 50-57 .) Federated fully defended this motion, arguing that the Utah
six year limitation period applied. Federated's pleadings and argument were detailed and
~

comprehensive. (R. at 110-129, primarilyR. 120-129, and Addendum, Exhibit "A".) Never
once did Federated argue or mention to the trial court in its pleadings that Mr. Shaw waived
his statute oflimitations defense. Id. Never once did Federated argue or mention to the trial
court in its pleadings that the choice oflaw clause required the cause of action to have arisen
in Utah making the borrowing statute inapplicable. Id. Federated makes these arguments only
now, on appeal.
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(ii;

II.

The course of proceedings and disposition in the court below.

Federated filed its lawsuit on June 11, 2013. (R. at I.) This was just shy of six years
from the date of Mr. Shaw's last payment (R. 168.) and over five years after Federated
(ii;

allegedly purchased Mr. Shaw's account from Advanta. (R. at 147.) Mr. Shaw answered the
complaint. (R. at 20.) He moved for summary judgment in January, 2014. (R. at 44.)
Federated opposed the summary judgment. (R. at 110.) Mr. Shaw filed a reply memorandum.
(R. at 176.) In order to block the trial court from ruling on Mr. Shaw's summary judgment,
Federated filed a motion to stay the case and submit it to arbitration. (R. at 234.) Mr. Shaw
opposed the motion to compel arbitration. (R. at 250.) On May 29, 1914, the trial court
granted Mr. Shaw's motion for summary judgment and denied Federated' s motion to compel
arbitration without oral argument. (R. 399 & 403.) The Court entered its judgment on June
29, 2014. (R. at 434 and Addendum, Exhibit "E".) Federated appealed on July 28, 2014.
(R. at 446.)

III.

Statement of facts.

Federated sued Mr. Shaw alleging that he owed Advanta on a credit card account. (R.
at 1-5.) Federated alleged thatAdvanta assigned the account to it/dat2. Mr. Shaw answered
Federated's complaint alleging "[a]s an affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that the
claims of the plaintiff are barred by the statute of limitations, which may be the four year
limitations period of the Pennsylvania statute for written contracts." (R. at 21.) Mr. Shaw
moved for summary judgment. (R. at 44.) He argued that the Pennsylvania four year

13
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limitation period controlled and it barred Federated's suit. (R. at 50-57.) Federated fully
defended this motion, arguing that the Utah six year limitation period applied. Federated's
pleadings and argument were detailed and comprehensive. (R. at 110-169, primarily R. 120128.) Never once did Federated argue or mention to the trial court in its pleadings that Mr.
Shaw waived his statute of limitations defense because he failed to identify the specific
statute upon which his defense was based. Id. 1 Federated makes that argument only now, on
appeal even though Mr. Shaw clearly alleged in his answer that Federated's lawsuit was
barred by the Pennsylvania four year limitation period for written contracts. Never once did
Federated argue or mention to the trial court in its pleadings that the choice of law clause
required the cause of action to have arisen in Utah making the borrowing statute inapplicable.
Its entire argument was focused on the forum selection clause, which was the argument that
it lost in Libby. Id. Federated makes that argument only now, on appeal.
The account was allegedly governed by a written contract entitled "Advanta Business
Card Agreement" (the "Agreement" herein). (R. at 7 & 60.). A copy of the Agreement is
attached to the Addendum as Exhibit "B". The monthly credit card statements produced
by the plaintiff and allegedly sent to Mr. Shaw show that the last payment was made to
Advanta on June 30, 2007. (R. at 168.) The plaintiff is not a citizen of Utah, but is a
Michigan corporation with its place of business in Michigan. (R. at 85 & 85.)
The Agreement attached to the plaintiffs Complaint and attached to the Addendum

1

See Addendum, Exhibit "A".
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as Exhibit "B", states the following at~ 6.

~

"You agree to make all payments in US dollars payable through
a US Financial Institution, either by check or money order
payable to us at the location and in the manner specified on your
periodic billing statement or in any other manner (such as by
electronic fund transfer or wire transfer) that we agree to and
provide procedures for."
In the next to the last paragraph of~ 6, the Agreement also states:

~

"Account payments are to be mailed to the address for payments
shown on your periodic billing statement. Payment must be
received by us at that address on or before the specified time on
the Payment Due Date stated on your periodic billing statement,
and must confonn to any specific requirements for making
payment which appear with or in your billing statement."
The next sentence of~ 6 states:
" Payments tendered to and accepted by us or our agent at a
location other than the address stated on your periodic billing
statement are not effective until received by us at the address
specified." [Emphasis added.] (R. at 48, 61 & 62.)
Advanta selected the address of "Advanta Bank Corp, PO Box 8088, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania 19101-8088" as the address that payments were to be sent on each and every
monthly statement. (R. at 68 - 81.) See Addendum Exhibit "C". This is the only address
contained on all monthly statements. Id. Four monthly statements have the notation in the
"Activity" section of the statements "Electronic Pymt Thank You SLC UT." Two of the
monthly statements have the added notation in the Activity section "Phone Pymt Svc Fee-Col
Salt Lake City UT." R. These notations memorialize Internet payments made by Mr. Shaw

@

and the charging of a service fee by Advanta. (R. 154, 155, 158 & 168.)
15
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue No. One - Waiver.
Federated argues that Mr. Shaw failed to identify the specific statute of limitations
barring its claims in his answer. Federated concludes that Mr. Shaw thereby waived the
defense. This issue is easily resolved in favor of Mr. Shaw. Federated misled the Court. It
stated "Shaw filed an Answer and raised as his fourth defense, [a]s an affirmative defense,
the defendant alleges that the plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations." Fed.
Brief, at 6. However, Mr. Shaw's answer specifically alleges "[a]s an affinnative defense,
the defendant alleges that the claims of the plaintiff are barred by the statute of limitations,
which may be the four year limitations period of the Pennsylvania statute for written
contracts." (R. at 21.)
Assuming that Federated desires to continue to waste the Court's time and resources
based upon this misrepresentation of a critical fact, Mr. Shaw must address Federated's
argument that the trial court should have picked up on his alleged failure to identify the
specific statute of limitation barring its suit. Federated concludes that the trial court
committed "plain error" by not doing so even though Federated never mentioned one word
about this imagined/false issue to the trial court in its pleadings opposing summaryjudgment.
The Court of Appeals already faced the exact issue now argued by Federated. It did
so in In re Estate ofLeFevre, 2009 UT App 286, ~ 29,220 P.3d 476. The party making the
same argument that Federated makes in the present case lost that argument. In LeFevre, two

16
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sets of children from two different women who were married to the same man (the second
wife after the first wife had passed away) were fighting over the estate of the husband. The
first set were known as the "Lefevre children" and the second set of children were
represented by one of them known as "Stout." Stout contended that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for summary judgment because the Lefevre children's petition was timebarred. On appeal, the Lefevre children countered that Stout waived a statute of limitations
defense because he did not assert the defense in a responsive pleading as required by Rule
l 2(h) URCP. The Court of Appeals held that:
"the Lefevre children failed to object to Stout's assertion of an unpreserved
statute of limitations defense in responding to his motion for summary
judgment. Rather, they addressed his defense on the merits, arguing that their
claims were not time-barred because the statute oflimitations was tolled by the
equitable discovery rule. Accordingly, the LeFevre children waived the right
to object to an unpreserved defense on appeal. .. noting that by not objecting
to an unpreserved affirmative defense, the plaintiff waived the defect ... any
objection to a defect of parties is waived, if not asserted by a party as provided
in Rule l 2(h) ..." [Internal quotes and citations omitted.]

~

Like the LeFevere children, Federated failed to raise any objection whatsoever to Mr. Shaw's
imagined failure to identify the specific statute oflimitations in his answer. It raised this issue
for the first time on appeal. Because of the false representation of a critical fact, Mr. Shaw
must address the following arguments.
1.

He could raise the identity of the specific limitation statute by motion.

2.

Federated had notice of the basis of his defense and was given the opportunity to
defend.

3.

Federated took full advantage of the opportunity and consented to litigation of the
17
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issue on the merits in the summary judgment proceedings.
4.

Federated failed to preserve its argument made in this appeal.

5.

The trial court did not commit plain error when it granted Mr. Shaw's motion for
summary judgment dismissing Federated's case when: 1) he expressly identified the
Pennsylvania four year statute of limitations for written contracts as the basis of his
statute oflimitations defense; 2) the application of the Pennsylvania four year statute
oflimitations was the basis of the court's decision and this issue was fully briefed and
argued by the parties in the summary judgment proceedings; and 3) at no time during
the proceedings did Federated argue or bring to the court's attention the issue it now
raises on appeal.

6.

Federated's counsel invited error by the trial court by making no mention of the
argument that Federated now makes on appeal.

Issue No. Two - Where the cause of action arose.
Federated did not argue to the trial court that the choice oflaw provision required that
its cause of action arise in Utah. It focused in its pleadings only on the forum selection
clause, which argument was rejected bythe Utah Supreme Court in Libby. It, thereby, waived
the new argument and failed to preserve the argument which is made for the first time on
appeal. By not considering Federated's argument, the trial court did not commit plain error
and Federated's counsel invited error by failing to make the argument.
The Court should rule consistent with over 100 years of Utah Supreme Court
precedent that, for purposes of interpreting the Utah borrowing statute, the cause of action
arises where performance under the contract was to be made. It should do so because there
is no compelling reason to overturn that precedent. The majority in Libby did not comment
on whether the precedent should be overturned. Justice Lee in his concurring opinion was
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not convinced that the subject rule should be overturned. He even questioned his own
speculation about a different rule. He simply presented no compelling reason for overturning
the precedent and such a reason is required by Utah law for doing so. In its brief, Federated
failed to point out any compelling reason for overturning the century of law. It simply failed
to meet its substantial burden of persuasion that this precedent should be overturned. Justice
Lee merely speculated in Libby that a new test might be considered. Such speculation
provides no guidance to this Court and should not be considered.
Finally, Federated's analysis of the issue of where the cause of action arises under the
borrowing statute is not supported by Utah case law, including the cases cited by it.

Issue No. Three - Mr. Shaw's place of performance did not change to Utah.
Federated next argues that Mr. Shaw modified the place of perfonnance to Utah from
Pennsylvania because he made four payments from his home in Texas over the Internet and
Advanta Bank noted these payments in the section of the monthly statements entitled
"Activity Since Last Statement." The trial court did not agree with this argument. The
undisputed facts, the terms of the credit card agreement and the monthly statements sent to
Mr. Shaw do not support Federated's argument.

ARGUMENT -ISSUE NO. ONE - WAIVER

I.

Mr. Shaw expressly alleged as an affirmative defense in his answer that the
claims of Federated may be barred by the Pennsylvania four year limitation
period for written contracts.
Federated's argument that Mr. Shaw did not specifically allege the statute of
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limitations that barred its claims and he, thereby, waived the defense is not supported by the
facts and is without merit. In his answer, he expressly alleged that "the claims of the plaintiff
are barred by the statute of limitations, which may be the four year limitations period of the
Pennsylvania statute for written contracts." (R. at 21.) Federated's waiver argument should
be summarily dismissed.

II.

Mr. Shaw could raise the identity of the specific limitation statute by motion. He
did so and Federated, thereby, had notice of the basis of his defense and was
given the opportunity to defend which was all that was required under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Federated took full advantage of the opportunity and
consented to litigation of the issue on the merits without ever raising the defense
it now asserts for the first time on appeal.
Federated's entire argument is premised on the belief that Mr. Shaw could only raise

the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations by alleging it in his answer. Since
Federated incorrectly argues that he did not allege the specific limitation statute, but only
generally alleged that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations, Federated
concludes that Mr. Shaw waived the defense. However, it fully litigated the merits of Mr.
Shaw's defense in summary judgment proceedings and Federated lost.
An affirmative defense "must be raised byway of answer, motion or demand so as to
put the issue before the trial court..." [Emphasis added.] Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter

Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979). The Court of Appeals restated this rule 26
years later in Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 2005 UT App 82,

,r 7, n. 2,

~

109 P.3d 393.

Citing Royal Resources Inc., the Court stated that an affirmative defense "must be raised by
way of answer, motion or demand so as to but the issue before the trial court ..." [Emphasis
20
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added.] Id.
In Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963), the defendants failed to plead a
subsequent agreement as an affirmative defense in their answer. Id. The plaintiff argued that
the defendants should not, therefore, be allowed to rely on the affirmative defense. Id. The
Utah Supreme Court stated that the trial judge "not only did not abuse his discretion in
allowing the issue to be raised and receiving the contract in evidence, but he would have
failed the plain mandate of justice had he refused to do so."Jd. The Court noted that the
plaintiff did not request a continuance so it could investigate the newly raised affirmative
4&}

defense and did not express any prejudice or disadvantage in having to meet that issue. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court reasoned:
"Itis true, as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., requires that affirmative
defenses be pleaded. It is a good rule whose purpose is to have the issues to be
tried clearly framed. But it is not the only rule in the book of Rules of Civil
Procedure. They must all be looked to in the light of their even more
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end
that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What they are entitled to is
notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is
accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules provide for liberality to
allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other party to have a reasonable
time to meet a new issue if he so requests. Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P., so states. It
further allows for an amendment to conform to the proof after trial or even
after judgment, and indicates that if the ends of justice so require, 'failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.' This idea is
confirmed by Rule 54(c)(l), U.R.C.P.: '[E]very final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
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party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. "'2
In the present case, Mr. Shaw pied the affirmative defense of the Pennsylvania statute
oflimitations. He then moved the trial court for summary judgment dismissing Federated's
case based on the running of the Pennsylvania four year limitations period. Federated had
notice of the basis of his defense and the opportunity to confront it. Federated fully argued
the merits of the motion without once making the argument it makes today on appeal. It had
notice and the opportunity to defend found by the Utah Supreme Court to be the fundamental
requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Federated, therefore, consented to the
trial court's consideration of the limitations defense. In Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT
App 44,

if

6, n.2, 19 P.3d 1005, this Court held that it will "affirm a trial court's

detennination that an issue was fully tried if it is apparent from the record that the opposing
party had notice of the claim and a fair opportunity to defend." [Internal quotes deleted.]
Accord, Guss v. Cheryl, Inc. 2010 UT App 249, ,r 10,240 P.3d 1142.

III.

Federated did not preserve its argument that Mr. Shaw waived his right to assert
the statute of limitations.

The Utah Supreme Court stated in Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, if 15, 164 P.3d 366:
"Generally, in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented
to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue. We have set forth three factors that help determine whether the trial

In Crowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518, ,i,r 36-39, 127 P.3d 1224, the Utah Court of Appeals
cited with approval the specific language of Cheney set forth above. It further set forth a digest of
cases where the failure to plead affirmative defenses under Rule 8 and the failure to allege with
particularity under Rule 9 was no bar to assertion of these defenses where the plaintiff had notice
of the defenses and the opportunity to defend. Id. at ,I 3 7.
2
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court had such an opportunity: ( 1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;
(2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. In short, a party may not claim
to have preserved an issue for appeal by merely mentioning an issue without
introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. Ultimately, the
preservation requirement is based on the premise that, in the interest of orderly
procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed
error and, if appropriate, correct it." [Internal quotes and citations omitted.]3
Federated did not raise before the trial court the issue of Mr. Shaw's alleged failure
to identify a specific limitations statute in his answer. Although the issue of the statute of
limitations was fully litigated in the summary judgment proceedings, Federated made no
mention of this argument. Federated did not preserve the argument.

IV.

The trial court did not commit plain error and Federated's counsel invited error
by the trial court if counsel really believed that Federated had the defense for
which it now argues.
Federated may argue on reply that the trial court committed plain error by not

considering Mr Shaw's alleged failure to identify a specific limitations statute in his answer.
Federated's argument will fail the test of plain error. In Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 16,
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"In cases where a party raises an issue on appeal, but the party did not properly
preserve the issue below, we review it under the manifest injustice or plain
error standard. Under plain error review, we may reverse the lower court on an
issue not properly preserved for appeal when a party can show the following:
(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable outcome for the party, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined. Nevertheless, under the invited error
See also, Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. NA, 2016 UT App 88, ,r,r 36 & 37,373 P.3d 189; and
Allen v. Allen, 2014 UT App 27, ,r 19,319 P.3d 770.
3
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doctrine, we have declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel,
either by statement or act, affiimatively represented to the trial court that he or
she had no objection to the proceedings."
No error was made. As set forth in detail above, Mr. Shaw moved the trial court to
dismiss the suit under the Pennsylvania four year statute of limitations. He alleged the
Pennsylvania statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in his answer and specifically
moved under the Pennsylvania statute. He had the right to bring the issue before the trial

~

court by motion. Rule 12(h). Federated tried that issue by express consent when it defended
the motion on its merits. Rule 15(b). Federated waived the right to assert its new argument
by not raising it before the trial court. Rule 12(h).
Federated' s argument fails the second test of plain error. The trial court was not
advised of the issue and given the opportunity to rule. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,

,r 16.

Federated basically argues that the Court should have searched all of the pleadings filed by
the parties and advocated on its behalf even though the issue was not obvious to its counsel.
~

If it was so obvious, Federated must ask itself why its counsel did not make the argument.
By failing to raise the issue with the trial court, Federated's counsel affirmatively
represented to the court that he had no objection to the proceeding based on the argument that
it now makes on appeal. He invited error by the trial court and now seeks to take advantage
of that perceived invited error. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Pratt,
"Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error. By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this
principle by discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court
24
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so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal. Further, parties are
not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of
objecting on appeal. Thus, encouraging counsel to actively participate in all
proceedings and to raise any possible error at the time of its occurrence
fortifies our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first
opportunity to address a claim of error." Id. at iJ 17. [Emphasis added.]
469

V.

The cases cited by Federated do not support its argument.
Even if Federated was correct with its facts, which it is not, that Mr. Shaw never

@

identified the Pennsylvania statute of limitations in his answer, the cases that it cites do not
support its argument. ItcitesPepperwoodHomeowners Ass 'n v. Mitchell, 2015 UT App 137,
351 P.3d 844, for the proposition that 1) Mr. Shaw failed to establish in his summary
judgment pleadings that he had the right to dismissal of Federated' s case; and 2) even though
Mr. Shaw fully presented all necessary facts in his summary judgment pleadings, the trial

Gp

court judge had a duty to search all of the previously filed pleadings for any possible defense
that Federated had and failed to make.
The first problem with Federated's argument is that Mr. Shaw identified the
Pennsylvania statute of limitations in his answer. The second problem is that Federated
places upon the trial court judge the duty to advocate on its behalf and argue an issue that its
own counsel did not deem important to raise. The third problem with citing Pepperwood is
that the moving party therein failed to place before the court the very contract upon which
it relied in a breach of contract claim. A judge faced with such a motion would have naturally
looked in the summary judgment pleadings for the contact upon which he or she was asked
@

to base judgment. It did not exist in Pepperwood and was an obvious error.
25
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In Pepperwood, the Court of Appeals stated that "the district court must still
determine whether the moving party's pleadings, discove1y, and affidavits demonstrate its

~

entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw." [Emphasis added and quotation omitted.] Id. at
~

6. Mr. Shaw presented every fact in his pleadings and declarations necessary to show that

Federated's claim was not filed within the Pennsylvania limitations period. The key facts,
admitted by Federated, were that almost six years had passed between Mr. Shaw's last
~

payment and Federated's suit, and that the subject credit card agreement submitted to the
court controlled the contractual relationship. See Federated Opp. Mem. Exhibit "A" of
Addendum. The key legal issue argued by Mr. Shaw was that the Utah Borrowing Statute
required application of the Pennsylvania four year limitation period See Shaw Mem. and
Reply Mem. (R. 46-57 & 187-192.) Federated's defense was solely based on the forum
selection clause of the agreement. It lost that argument before the trial court and in the
Supreme Court's decision in Libby and it did not appeal that issue.
As the Pepperwood court stated "[g]enerally, we will not consider an issue unless it
has been preserved for appeal by first presenting the issue to the district court in such a way
that the district court has the opportunity to rule upon it." Id. at 111. The Court went on to
hold that in a summary judgment proceeding based on a contract that was not supplied to the
trial court in the pleadings, the error was so obvious that the court committed plain error. In
the present case, Federated asked the trial court to advocate on its behalf and search for any
possible defenses in previously filed pleadings. Federated simply did not present the issue
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it now argues for the first time on appeal in such a way that the trial court had an opportunity
to rule on it. Federated cannot be saved by the plain error doctrine and simply created an
"invited error."
Federated claims that the case of Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 177 P.3 600, supports
the same argument that it made about the Peppe,wood case. Again, this decision does not
support Federated's position. Johnson testified that he had no ownership interests in limited
partnerships or limited liability companies at a supplemental proceeding brought by the Small
Business Administration ("SBA") to collect a judgment from Johnson. In a different and
subsequent lawsuit between Johnson and Orvis, Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment
arguing that Johnson was judicially es topped from claiming an ownership interest in a limited
partnership with Orvis because of his testimony before the SBA. The trial court agreed with
Orvis and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court overturned the decision based
on Utah law regarding judicial estoppel that required Johnson's testimony before the SBA
to have been in a case also involving Orvis and that Orvis relied on the prior testimony and
changed his position based thereon. Id. at

,r,r 6 & 7.

Orvis failed to submit facts in his

summary judgment pleadings showing any of these facts. The Supreme Court held that Orvis
failed to meet all of the elements of judicial estoppel. Id. at ,r 13.
The Supreme Court noted that "[ s]urnmary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
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is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." [Emphasis added.] Id. Mr. Shaw set forth all
~

facts necessary to support his motion for summary judgment and he supported them with
citations to pleadings, discovery and declarations, many of which facts were admitted by
Federated. He argued the borrowing statute and Utah case law which supported his position.
Neither he nor the trial court were under any obligation to search all pleadings previously
filed to come up with a defense for Federated which was ignored by its counsel. It was never
raised until this appeal, and when it was raised it was based on clearly false facts.
Federated cites Conder v. Hunt, 2000 UT App 105, 1 P.3d 558, to support its
argument that Mr. Shaw waived his affirmative defense. Neither the facts nor Conder
support that argument. In that case, the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing
Conder's claims based upon the statute of limitations for fraud. The Court of Appeals found
that Conder never sued for fraud and concluded that the defendants' statute of limitations
defense based on fraud failed. The Court noted "in their motions for summary judgment,
aside from a single passing reference, defendants argued only the statute applicable to fraud
actions." [Emphasis added.] Id. at ,r 13. The Court recognized that the defendants' summary
judgment pleadings failed to properly allege the statute of limitations. Mr. Shaw's answer
and summary judgment pleadings fully, and correctly set forth the Pennsylvania statute of
limitations which applied through the Utah borrowing statute.
Federated cites Bernard &Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor Com 'n, 2005 UT App 401, 122
P.3d 700. In that case, the Court of Appeals determined that Bernard & Burk had not
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sufficiently alleged the statute of limitations in its answer. The case went to trial without the
affinnative defense of the statute of limitations being raised. The Labor Commission mled
that going to trial with a failure to specifically set forth the express statute was a waiver of
@>

the statute of limitations. That case has no application to the facts of the present case. Mr.
Shaw identified the Pennsylvania statute oflimitations in his answer. He and Federated fully
litigated the statute oflimitations issue in a summary judgment proceeding long before a trial.
Federated had full notice of his argument and an opportunity to address it. Indeed, Federated
took advantage of the opportunity and fully briefed and litigated the issue. Federated also
chose to not raise the issue of whether Mr. Shaw sufficiently pled the limitations defense in
the summary judgment proceeding.
Federated cites Wasatch Mines Co. V. Hopkinson,465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970). In that
case, the trial court conducted a trial on competing claims in the complaint and a
counterclaim. Id. at I 007. Among the several rulings after the trial, the district court ruled
that the plaintiffs claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Id. On cross appeal, the
plaintiff asserted that its claims should not have been barred by the statute of limitations

\%)

because the defendant failed to allege the specific statute which applied. A majority of the
Court ruled that Rule 9(h) required the defendant to plead the specific statute prior to trial
and overruled the district court. Id. at 1010. Like Federated's other cited cases, this case fails
to address the situation in the present case. Mr. Shaw set forth in detail in his summary
judgment pleadings the grounds for dismissal based on the Pennsylvania four year limitations
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period. (R. at 46-57 & 187-192.) Federated fully defended that issue in its opposition
memorandum. Id. Federated never once raised the argument it argues on appeal.
Judge Crockett's dissent in Wasatch Mines should be noted. He would have allowed
the statue of limitations defense, citing Rule 1 that pleadings "shall be liberally construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." He continued that
under Rule 8(t) "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." He further
~

noted that Rule 54(c)(l) provided that "[e]very finaljudgment shall grant the relief to which
the party ... is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings ..."
[Ellipse in the original.] Id. at 1012. He recognized that Rule 9(h) was not the only rule in
the Rules. Judge Crockett then hit the nail on the head when he stated "[ w]hat the plaintiff
was entitled to was to be informed in clear and understandable language the issue raised and
the defense relied upon. This it had in the answer which set forth expressly as an affirmative
defense that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." [Citations and internal quotes
omitted.] Id.
ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. TWO - WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE

I.

Federated did not argue to the trial court that the choice of law provision
required that its cause of action arise in Utah. It, thereby, waived the argument
and· failed to preserve the argument which is now made for the first time on
appeal.

Federated lost its appeal in Libby based on an opposition memorandum virtually
identical to the opposition memorandum of Federated in the present case. See Shaw
opposition memorandum (R. at 120-127.), Addendum Exhibit "A"; and Libby opposition
30
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memorandum, Addendum Exhibit "F". Federated's losing argument was based on the forum
selection clause. This argument is the same as the one made in the present case before the
trial court. Federated now creates a new argument in this appeal. The new argument is that
Gj

the language" [a] cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction" in Utah's borrowing
statute must fall to Federated's choice of Utah law provision in the credit card agreement.
Yet, Federated never once mentioned the choice of law provision before the trial court. It
simply did not preserve this argument for appeal.
Federated tells this Court to look to the Record at pages 114-115, 119, 123-2 7 & 400
for its preservation of this issue. See Fed. brief at 2. The first cite, R. at 114-115 is a portion
of the statement of facts section of Federated's Memorandum in Opposition to Mr. Shaw's
summary judgment ("Fed. Opp. Mem.). The choice of law provision is not argued. The
second cite, R. at 119, is also a portion ofFederated's statement of facts. Again, the choice
of law provision is not argued. In fact, the next page, R. at 120, leads into Federated's
argument. It has two section titles: "The Forum-Selection Clause of the Agreement Governs
in This Case," and "Forum-Selection Clauses are Valid and Enforceable." Clearly, Federated

~

was making the same argument that it lost in Libby which was based on the forum selection
clause. There is no mention of the choice of law argument that Federated makes for the first

~

time in this appeal.
The third preservation cite, R. at 123-127, does not mention the choice of law
argument. The section titles for these pages are "Utah Borrowing Statute should not be
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Construed to Rewrite the Forum-Selection Clause of the Agreement," "If the Court Applies
the Borrowing Statute Here, It Will Allow Defendant to Forum Shop," and "Because the
Agreement Contains a Forum Selection-Clause, Pingree Is Not Applicable and Does Not
Alter the Parties Agreement to Apply Utah's Six-Year Statute of Limitations." Each of these
arguments are based on the forum selection clause. Each of these arguments were rejected
by the Supreme Court in Libby, at iJil 12-25. None of these arguments are based on the choice
of law provision, the new argument made for the first time in this appeal.

4

The fourth preservation cite, R. at 400, is a short portion of the trial court's written
decision wherein the judge considered Federated's argument about the notation of "Ut" in
the "Activity Since Last Statement" section of a monthly credit card statement for an Internet
payment initiated by Mr. Shaw in Texas. The trial judge ruled that the credit card agreement
stated that any payment tendered to an address other than the specific address of, "Advanta
Bank Corp, PO Box 8088, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101-8088," (R. at 70.) was not
effective until received at Advanta' s offices at that address. The court concluded that the
notation in the activity section of the monthly statement of"Ut" was not an address and that
the credit card agreement clearly required payment to be received at the specific Philadelphia
address before it became "effective." The judge's decision had nothing to do with the choice
of law argument made in this appeal.
4

Federated has a short sub-argument in one of its sections regarding the forum selection
clause that the most significant relationship test should govern. (R. at 124.) That test was
not adopted by the majority in Libby and was expressly rejected by Justice Lee's
concurring opinion. Id. at if 34.
32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Justice Lee states that the Libby case should not foreclose consideration of the choice
of law issue "in a future case." Libby at

il

33. However, this is not "the future case."

Federated never once raised the choice of law provision argument before the trial court. It,
~

thereby, waived and failed to preserve the argument. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 1 15, 164
P .3d 366. As required in Pratt, it failed to: ( 1) raise the issue in a timely fashion; (2) failed
to specifically raise it; (3) and failed to introduce evidence and legal authority supporting the
argument. Id. 5 The trial court had no opportunity to rule on the issue. Federated failed the
test of preservation, committed a waiver and is judicially estopped from raising the issue
today.
II.

The trial court did not commit plain error and Federated's counsel invited error
by the trial court if counsel really believed that Federated had the defense for
which it now argues.
As pointed out above regarding the first issue - waiver, Federated may try to argue

another issue in its reply brief; that the trial court committed plain error by not advocating
0D

on behalf of Federated and coming up with the argument that it now makes in this appeal.
Such an argument should be sunnnarily rejected because it was not raised in its initial brief.
@

Further, the argument will fail on its merits. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 116.
Federated's argument fails the first test of plain error. No error was made. As
discussed at length below, this court should not upset more than 100 years of precedent based
on Justice Lee's concurring opinion that provides no guidance whatsoever in support of a

See also, Mitchell v. ReconTrust Co. NA, 2016 UT App 88, ,r,r 36 & 37, 373 P.3d 189; and
Allen v. Allen, 2014 UT App 27, ,r 19,319 P.3d 770.
5
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new test for "where the cause of action arises." Second, any error was not obvious to the trial
court. It ruled consistent with over 100 years of precedent. Indeed, Federated's own counsel
failed to recognize or make the argument. Federated simply failed to advise the trial court of
the argument that it makes today and give the court an opportunity to rule.

~

By failing to raise the issue with the trial court, Federated's counsel would have
affirmatively represented to the court that he had no objection to the proceeding based on the
argument that Federated now makes on appeal. As argued above regarding the first issue, he
would have invited error by the trial court and would seek to take advantage of that perceived
invited error.

III.

The Court should rule consistent with over 100 years of Utah Supreme Court
precedent because there is no compelling reason to overturn that precedent.
Utah has over 100 years of precedent that holds that a cause of action for breach of

contract arises where the parties detennined that the contract was to be performed. That
precedent should not be disturbed, especially in light of Justice Lee's concurring opinion in
Libby. As set forth below, Justice Lee could not come up with any compelling reason to

overturn that precedent and no such reason exists in the present case or is argued by
~

Federated.
Statutes oflimitations are procedural laws. Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 870 (Ut.
Ct. App. 1994), citing Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993). Matters of procedure
are governed by the law of the forum, i.e. the law of the state in which the lawsuit is brought.
Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. ofCounty Comm ofBroward County, Florida, 2001 UT 101,
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,r 14,

37 P.3d 1093, citing Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681,684 n. 3 (Utah 1981). As a general rule,
Utah's statutes of limitations apply to actions brought in Utah. Financial Bancorp, Inc. v.

Pingree and Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 17 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994); the Utah statutes oflimitations
govern suit on a note or loan in an action brought in Utah.
Federated brought this suit in Utah. Thus, the statutes oflimitations of Utah apply to
this lawsuit. These statutes include the Utah borrowing statute. Libby at 19; and Financial

Bancorp, Inc. at

1 17. This statute,

Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-103, which is attached as

Exhibit "G" of the Addendum, provides:

"A cause of action which aries in another jurisdiction, and which is not
actionable in the other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not be
pursued in this state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state
who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued." 6
A cause of action for breach of contract arises in the state in which the parties
determine that performance was to be performed: Brown v. Bach, 17 Utah 435, 53 P. 991
<i

(1898), overruled on other grounds, Sanipoli v. Pleasant Valley Coal, Co., 31 Utah 114
( 1906), a cause of action for non-payment of a note or breach of a contract arises where the
note was to be paid or the contract performed. See also, Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P.
520 (1908), when the parties stipulate to performance of a ·contract in a certain state, the
cause of action for breach of that contract arises in that stipulated state, adopting the rule of

6

The exception in the last phrase of the statute does not apply to Federated. The cause of action
in the present lawsuit is not held by a citizen of Utah. Federated is a Michigan corporation with
its primary place of business in that state. Even if Federated were a citizen of Utah, it received
the account after it was in default and after the cause of action had already accrued. (R. at 47.)
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Brown; Hecla Gold-min. Co. v. Gisborn, 21 Utah 68, 59 P. 518 ( 1900); and Financial
Banc01p. Inc. V. Pingree and Dahle, Inc. at 17; unless the contract states otherwise, a cause
of action for breach of contract generally arises where the parties determined that the contract
was to be perfonned. 7
The credit card agreement and monthly statements required that payment be made in
Pennsylvania. In fact, the agreement stated that any payment made in other states was not
~

"effective" until it was received in Federated's offices at a specific address in Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania has a four year statute of limitations for beach of contract. 42 Pa. C.S.A. §
5525(a)(8), a copy of which is Exhibit "H" of the Addendum. See also, Cooper v. Sirota,
37 Fed.Appx. 46 (3 rd Cir. (Pa.) 2002); Pennsylvania statute of limitations for breach of
written contracts is four years. Federated sued Mr. Shaw well after five years had passed
from the date of any breach and from the date of his last payment. (R. at. 4 7.)
The Utah Supreme Court stated in WolfMountain Resorts, L.C. v. ACS, 2010 UT 65,

,r 23,245 P.3d:
"[L]ong standing precedent should not be overruled except for the most
compelling reasons. Any party asking a court to overturn prior precedent has
a substantial burden of persuasion. This burden is mandated by the doctrine of
stare decisis. A court will follow the rule of law which it has established in
earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous
or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than
harm will come by departing from precedent." [Internal quotes and citations
omitted.]

7

Justice Lee acknowledged in his concurring opinion in Libby at ,r 3 7, that this is the current

state of law in Utah.
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Justice Lee joined a unanimous Court in Vorher v. Henroid, 2013 UT 10,113,297

P.3d 614. In that opinion, the Court wrote:

~

"Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a party asking us to overturn prior
precedent has a substantial burden of persuasion. Long standing precedent
should not be overruled except for the most compelling reasons. Specifically,
we may overturn our precedent if we are clearly convinced that the rule was
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and
that more good than hann will come by departing from precedent." [Internal
citations and quotes omitted.] Id.

~

A.

The Utah Supreme Court was not "clearly convinced" that the subject
rule should be overturned and presented no compelling reason for doing
so.

In Libby, the Supreme Court was not "clearly convinced" that it should overturn the
common law rule that a cause of action in a contract case arises where the contract was to be
perform. The majority opinion did not discuss the issue and Justice Lee in his concurring
opinion was not committed to overturning this precedent that has stood for well over 100
years. He stated:
"I see arguments going both ways on this question. Our precedent, after all,
long ago interpreted the borrowing statute as incorporating the place of
perfonnance test. See Lawson v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P.520, 522-23 (1908).
And it is certainly possible to view the statute as retaining that test going
forward .... But it also seems possible to interpret the statute as embracing
whatever evolving standard our law has adopted for choosing the governing
law. If so, a claim arising under a contract with an enforceable choice-of-law
clause would arise in the state whose law governs its disposition." Id. at 137.
Neither the majority in Libby, nor Justice Lee in his concurring opinion set forth a
"compelling reason" for overturning the precedent. The majority does not mention any reason
@

for doing so. Neither does Justice Lee. He only states that it is "at least arguable" that the
37
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

precedent might be overturned. But, in the same breath, he states that "it is certainly possible
to view the statute as retaining that test [the 100 years of precedent] going forward." Id. This
position hardly meets the compelling reason standard necessary for overturning long standing
precedent. Nor does it give this Court any guidance as the test to be used or facts and issues
to be considered in overturning the precedent.

B.

Federated has not met its "substantial burden of persuasion" that this
precedent should be overturned.

Federated argues three points as justification for overturning the precedent. Its
argument does not meet the "substantial burden of persuasion" required by the Utah Supreme
Court.

The existing precedent does not inhibit the right to contract.

1.

Federated argues that all men and women have the constitutional right to contract and
that overturning the 100 years of precedent will enhance that right by allowing them to
submit to the personal jurisdiction and law of a chosen state. Fed brief at 27. Federated
further states, without argument, that freedom to contract aids other policy considerations
including protecting a party's rights of expectation, certainty, predictability and uniformity.

Id. The precedent that a cause of action arises in the forum where the contract was breached,
i.e. payment was to be made, in no way inhibits the right of parties to contract. For over one
hundred years, Utah citizens have had that right notwithstanding the precedent presently
before the Court.
Forum selection clauses and choice oflaw clauses have been fully enforceable. Parties
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have always been able to select the substantive law to be applied to a contract. Federated
simply complains that Utah Courts have chosen to apply the law of the forum to procedural
issues such as the statute oflimitations. The procedural law of Utah includes the borrowing
statute. Libby at il 9. For over one hundred years, interpretation of the Utah boo-owing statute
includes an understanding that a cause of action for breach of contract arises in the state
where performance was to be made, which in the present case was Pennsylvania. What
Federated is really complaining about is that it or its attorney did not know Utah law or made
a mistake about Utah law when it chose to sit on its Advanta accounts for almost six years
after it purchased them before it brought suit. It now asks this Court to dig it out of its
predicament by overturning over 100 years of precedent based on a meritless argument that
(iii

the precedent inhibits its right to contract.
Advanta had every right to include in its credit card agreements a provision that
required the Utah six year statute of limitations to apply to any lawsuits. It chose not to do

Gtb}

so. Federated had every right to walk away from its purchase of thousands of Advanta's
credit card accounts because this provision was missing. It chose not to do so. Federated had
~

every right to timely file suit. It chose not to do so. Federated is asking this Court to limit,
under existing Utah law, the contractual rights of the card holders such as Mr. Shaw because
it made a mistake. Federated received what it should have "expected" under the agreement
and Utah law, which was clearly "predictable" and should be "uniformly'' applied to all of
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the identical agreements in Federated's several appeals. 8

2.

The existing precedent is the most "judicially economical."

Federated next argues that "[h]onoring the parties' freedom to contract, and their right
to avail themselves of the forum and law governing their dispute helps spare the courts the

~

complex and tedious choice of law analysis under the 'most significant relationship' test."
Fed. brief at 16. First, no Utah appellate court has adopted the most significant relationship
test for a determination of where the cause of action arose in any situation especially
interpretation of procedural law such as the Utah borrowing statute. In fact, Justice Lee
expressly rejected the most significant relationship test in his concurring opinion in Libby at

,r 34 as did the full Supreme Court reject it for a test of procedural law in Trillium at ,r 14.
Next, the obvious solution to protecting the courts from such a "tedious task" and
"fractured opinions" is to apply a simple, bright line test that does not require factual findings
and legal conclusions on numerous issues. The simplest and brightest line test that could be
~

created by the courts would be application of the place of performance test that has been the
law in Utah for over I 00 years. All the court needs to do is determine where the contract was
to be performed; one simple fact. The court would then apply the limitation period of the

8

Federated's argument sounds very similar to the argument that it made in Libby with respect to
the forum selection clause. In Libby, it complained to the Supreme Court that it did not receive
the benefit of its contractual bargain of the forum selection clause. Id. at
15 & 16. The Court
stated that the district court "gave the company precisely what it bargained for [when it dismissed
its suit]." Id. The forum selection clause required the agreement to be governed by all of Utah's
laws, including the borrowing statute. Id. "In fact, on appeal Federated essentially asks this court
to give it a better deal than it bargained for." Id.

,r,r
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state in which the contract was to be performed.

3.

The existing law is quite simple to apply.

Federated next argues for simplicity. It acknowledges that Utah applies the law of the
forum for procedural issues and argues that the simplest rule would be for the courts to allow
it to select the law that applies to procedural issues. It concludes that it selected this law in
its choice of law provision. The problem with this argument is that its choice of law
provision did not choose Utah procedural law that would apply to enforcement of the credit
card agreement. It chose the substantive law. Having failed to chose the procedural law, the
Utah courts were left to apply Utah procedural law which included the borrowing statute and
which included the interpretation of the statue that has stood for over 100 years.
IV.

Justice Lee merely speculated that a test other than the one supported by over
100 years of precedent might be considered. Such speculation provides no
guidance to this Court.
Justice Lee states in his concurring opinion in Libby:
"I write separately, however, to emphasize the limited nature of the court's
decision in this case. I note, in particular, that the court's decision follows from
a key concession made by Federated Capital in the course of this litigation that its cause of action arose in another jurisdiction (Pennsylvania). And I
would emphasize that this concession takes a threshold question - of the
applicability of the borrowing statute in a case like this one - off the table." Id.
at ,r 32.

~

The issue of whether the cause of action arose in Utah was "on the table" only because
of Federated' s argument that some payments were made over the Internet and the monthly
statements showed in the activity section of the monthly statements the word "UT". Libby
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at il 20. That argument was debunked by the trial court using the language of the credit card
agreement that stated that payments were not effective until received at Advanta' s offices
located at "Advanta Bank Corp, PO Box 8088, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101-8088," (R.
at 70.). Id. Federated never argued (and never put on the table) the argument that the cause
of action arose in Utah, rather than Pennsylvania, because of the argument suggested by
Justice Lee. Justice Lee's suggested argument was that the Utah choice of law provision
could "arguably'' require the cause of action to have arisen in Utah. The failure of Federated
to raise this argument is important because it further cements the fact that Federated failed
to preserve this issue in Libby and in the present case. The majority in Libby pointed out that
Federated "in its opposition to summary judgment in each case before the district court ...
assumed that its causes of action arose at the place of performance under the Agreement
[Pennsylvania]." Libby at if 20. Federated's opposition memorandum filed in the trial court
in Libby and the opposition memorandum filed in the trial court in the present case are almost
identical and do not make the argument suggested by Justice Lee or made by Federated
herein. See Federated' s summary judgment memorandums filed in the present case and filed
in Libby, Exhibits "A" and "F" to Addendum.
Justice Lee continues in Libby:
"This is an important decision that a court should take up in a future case, and
that should not be deemed to be foreclosed by our decision today. . . The
borrowing statute's "arises in" formulation, after all, is at least arguably a
reference to a choice-of-law principle. And the choice-of-law determination
in a case like this one _is dictated not by the common law inquiry into place of
performance or most significant relationship." Id. at if 33 & 34.
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Justice Lee refers to this new legal doctrine that he wants a future court to consider
without any direction to the future court. Indeed, he questions in his own mind if it is a viable
doctrine. Libby at ,I 37. Possibly, he does so because he recognizes that the Supreme Court
ruled within the last sixteen years that a choice oflaw provision applies to substantive law,
not procedural law. Trillium, at ,I 14. The majority in Libby also recognized that a choice of
law provision applies to substantive law, not procedural law such as the Utah borrowing
statute. Id. at ,I 13. Justice Lee does not analyze the issue in his concurring opinion. He
simply cites three cases that led him to believe that a change might be considered. The first
~

case, Myers v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 275 Or. 501, 553 P.2d 355,366 & 67 (1976) adopts
a most significant relationship test; a test expressly rejected by Justice Lee and contrary to
the over 100 years of precedent of our Supreme Court. See Libby at iJ 34. In fact, the Utah
Supreme Court rejected the most significant relationship test for choice of law issues
regarding procedure as recently as 2001 in Trillium. Id. at iJ 14. The other two cases cited by
Justice Lee, Bates v. Cook, Inc., 509 So. 2d 1112, 1113 & 14 (Fl. 1987) and Employers Ins.

of Wausau v. Eh/co Liq. Trust, 723 N.E. 2d 687, 693 & 94 (Ill. 1999) also adopt the most
~

significant relationship test which was rejected in Utah.
The Utah Supreme Court has maintained a bright line dichotomy between substantive
law and procedural law. See Trillium at iJ 14 and Libby at iJ 13. A contractual choice oflaw
provision applies to substantive law. Id. It does not apply to procedural law including the
statute of limitations. Id. If a choice of law analysis such as the most significant relationship
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test is viable in Utah, which is doubtful, it applies only to the choice of substantive law. Id.
at ,r,r 14 & 15 and Libby at ,r 34.
The forum selection clause raises the issue that is presently before the Court and was
before the Supreme Court in Libby. It "binds" the parties to the procedural laws of Utah.

Libby at ,r 13. All matters of procedure are governed by the law of the forum, in this case
Utah. Id. The borrowing statute is one of these laws. Id. The law that a contract cause of
action arises in the state where performance was to be made is also one of these Utah laws,
albeit a common law. Lawson, at 522-23. (Also, recognized by Justice Lee as the law of
Utah. See Libby at ,r 37.)

V.

Federated's analysis of the issue of where the cause of action arises is not
supported by Utah case law, including the cases cited by it.
A.

Federated misstates the holding in Financial Bank Corp., Inc. v. Pingree
and Dahle, Inc.

This Court ruled on the issue before it today in Financial Bank Corp., Inc. v. Pingree

and Dahle, at *17. The Court stated that "[u]nless the contract states otherwise, a cause of
action for a breach of contract generally arises where the contract is to be performed." This
law is consistent with the law announced by the Utah Supreme Court over 100 years ago in

Lawson, at 522 -23, and acknowledged by Justice Lee in Libby, at ,r 37, as the current law
in Utah. To overcome this language, Federated argues that "unless the contract says
otherwise" should be interpreted to mean "unless the contract has a choice of law provision
choosing Utah law." Fed. Br. at 26. This Court was not talking about a choice of law
~
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provision when it wrote the above statement in Pingree. It is clear from the language used
by the Court, the cases cited by the Court and the issue before the Court that the Court meant
what it said; unless the contract chooses a specific jurisdiction other than where it is to be
performed as the place where the cause of action arises, the cause of action will arise where
it is to be performed. Pingree does not support Federated's position that a choice of law
provision determines where the cause of action arose. The Court was clear that "matters of
procedure [are to] be governed by the law of the forum." Id. at *16. Statutes oflimitations
are procedural. Id. The Utah borrowing statute is a stature of limitations. Id. The test for
@

"arises in" under Utah procedural law is where the contract was to be performed. Id. at 17.
The basis for the Court's holding in Pingree is found in decades of Utah case law
which recognizes the dichotomy between procedural law and substantive law. This
dichotomy is summarized in the Supreme Court's decision in Trillium and restated in Libby.
A choice of law provision does not apply to procedural issues. Trillium at ii 14 & 15 and

Libby at i 13. Procedural issues are determined by the procedural law of Utah when suit is
brought in Utah. Id. A choice of law provision applies to substantive law. Id.
Federated next argues that the contract in Pingree had a choice of law provision
applying California law. Thus, the Court found that the claim arose in California and this
Court should follow this reasoning and find that since the present contract had a Utah choice
of law provision, the cause of action arose in Utah. Fed. Br. at 25 & 26. This argument
misstates the holding in Pingree. The Pingree court was faced with a contract that did not
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state where performance was to be made. It, therefore, held that "[b]ecause the contract is
silent regarding the place of payment, we presume payment was to be made where the payee
resides or at its place ofbusiness." Id. at* 17. Since the payee resided in California, the Court
continued "hence, we conclude that the cause of action arose in California ... " Id. In the
present case, the contract expressly provided for performance in Pennsylvania. Thus, the
cause of action arose in Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania limitation period applied. See

Pingree, at* 17, "a cause of action for breach of contract generally arises where the contract
is to be performed."

B.

Federated's position is not supported by the other cases that it cites.

It is unclear why Federated cites Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 2001
UT 71,126, IO P.3d 338. After the cite, Federated quotes the court for the proposition that
"[i]t is an elementary principle of the law of contracts that the place where the last act is done
which is necessary to give validity to a contract is the place where the contract is made." Fed.
Br. at 21. Although Mr. Shaw does not understand why Federated would cite this case
without any argument about its application to the present case, he agrees that this is an
elementary principal of contract law when the Court is dealing with the formation of a
contract, as was the case in Surety Underwriters. Id. at ,r,r 25 & 26. In Surety, the Supreme
Court had to decide if a company was conducting an insurance/surety business without being
qualified to do so in Utah. If so, then the insurance contract would have been void as being
illegal. The Court found, that as a matter of formation of contract law, the contract was
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signed by the parties in Utah. Thus, the company was required to be licensed by the state of
Utah; the company was operating without a Utah license; and the contract was void as being
illegal. Id. The case at bar is about enforcement of a contract, a procedural law issue of where
the cause of action arose under Utah's borrowing statute. There is plenty of Utah case law
directly addressing that issue. The case at bar is not about creation of a contract.
Federated cites three non-Utah cases for the proposition that when interpreting the
Utah borrowing statute "a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action." Fed. Br.
at 24. If the cases truly apply to a procedural statute such as the borrowing statute, they are
in direct conflict with the Utah law discussed above. However, the cases do not apply to a
procedural statute. They do not support Federated's argument.
Federated quotes language from Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) v. Branam, 126 So.
3d, 297,303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) "because the dispute arises under the contract and the
contract contains a choice oflaw provision, the time limitations of the forum chosen by the
parties apply." Great Lakes involved an insurance claim on a boat that was destroyed by
hijackers. Claims were made on the policy, all outside of 90 days. A Florida statute barred
the claims because they were outside its required 90 day period.New York did not have such
a limitation for claims on the insurance policy. The court determined that the dispute arose
under the policy. Id. at 303. The court also found that the contract had a New York choice
of law provision and concluded that a New York statute applied that did not have a 90 day
limitation to file claims with the insurance company. Thus, the claims were timely. The time
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period to which Federated is referring is not a statute oflimitations period, although it leads
the Court to believe it is such. It is a pre-suit period during which notices must be sent to
meet the contractual requirements of an insurance policy. This is a classic substantive law
issue to which a choice of law provision would apply. Great Lakes has nothing to do with
the issue presented to this court which involves enforcement of a contract, the consequent
application of the forum state's (Utah) procedural law to that enforcement, and over 100
years of precedent interpreting one of those procedural laws, the Utah borrowing statute.
The second case cited by Federated is American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler

Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). In this case, both the plaintiff and the defendant manufactured
pumps. The plaintiff complained that the defendant defamed the quality of its pump by
stating that the plaintiffs pump infringed on the defendant's patents. The defendant sued in
federal court alleging that the case involved a federal question, patent law. The U.S. Supreme
Court disagreed holding that the case was a standard, run-of-the-mill business defamation
case. Id. at 259 & 60. In doing so, the Court held that since federal patent law did not apply,
the validity of the defamation cause of action depended on whether the law of the state where
the cause of action arose would allow such a defamation suit. Id. Such language refers to the
elements of defamation, a tort, which is state substantive law and differs from state to state.
This case has nothing to do with the issue presented to this court in the present case which
involves enforcement of a contract and the consequent application of the forum state's (Utah)
procedural law to that enforcement.
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The third case cited by Federated is Meeker R & D, Inc. v. Evenflow Co., Inc., 52 N.E.
@

3d 1207 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). That case was a breach of contract case that had evidentiary
issues involving a patent. Id. at

,r,r 1 & 2. In discussing whether the case arose under federal

patent law or state law, the court cited American Well Works at

,r

14, "[f]or statutory

purposes, a case can arise under federal law in two ways. Most directly, a cause arises under
federal law when federal law creates the cause of action asserted. (A suit arises under the law
~

that creates the cause of action.)" [Internal cites and quotes omitted.] The court was
addressing whether a contract action had enough connection to patent law to be brought in
@

federal court under federal question jurisdiction. The case has nothing to do with the issue
presented to this court in the present case which involves enforcement of a contract and the
consequent application of the forum state's (Utah) procedural law to that enforcement.
Finally, Federated cites Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 927 P.2d
186, 190 (Utah 1996) for its one sentence argument and quote: because there was "an
effective choice of law by the parties here, the most significant relationship", place of
performance test and other choice of law rules do not apply. Fed. brief at 23. Actually, the

@

Supreme Court held that "parties to an automobile insurance contract cannot change their
bargain or have the bargain changed for them every time they drive across a state line.
Therefore, Idaho law governs the construction of the Idaho insurance contract before us." Id.
at 190 (End of§ B.3, Utah Law.) [Emphasis added.] This holding was about the construction
of the terms of an insurance contract which is substantive law to which a choice of law
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provision would apply. The case does not hold that a choice of law provision applies to
procedural law, which is the issue before this Court.

ARGUMENT - ISSUE NO. THREE - MR. SHAW'S PLACE OF PERFORMANCE
DID NOT CHANGE TO UTAH
Federated next argues that Mr. Shaw modified the place of performance to Utah from
Pennsylvania because he made four payments from his home in Texas over the Internet and
Advanta Bank noted these payments in the section of the monthly statements entitled
"Activity Since Last Statement." The trial court did not agree with this argument. The
undisputed facts before the trial court were found within the written credit card agreement
that Federated alleged formed the contractual agreement between the parties and the written
monthly statements sent to Mr. Shaw. Paragraph 6 of the agreement states:
"You agree to make all payments in US dollars payable through a US Financial
Institution, either by check or money order payable to us at the location and in
the manner specified on your periodic billing statement or in any other manner
(such as .by electronic fund transfer or wire transfer) that we agree to and
provide procedures for." [Emphasis added.]
The next to the last paragraph of paragraph 6 states:
"Accunt payments are to be mailed to the address for payments shown on your
periodic billing statement. Payment must be received by us at that address on
or before the specified time on the Payment Due Date stated on your periodic
billing statement, and must conform to any specific requirements for making
payment which appear with or in your billing statement. Payments tendered to and accepted
by us or our agent at a location other than the address stated on your periodic billing
statement are not effective until received by us at the address specified." [Emphasis added.]
(R. at 48, 61 & 62.)
Advanta selected the address of "Advanta Bank Corp, PO Box 8088, Philadelphia,
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Pennsylvania 19101-8088" as the address that payments were to be sent on each and every
monthly account statement. (R. at 68 - 81.) This is the only address that appears on every
statement. See statements in Addendum as Exhibit "C".

Four of the earliest monthly

statements have the notation in the "Activity" section of the statements "Electronic Pymt
Thank You SLC UT." (R. 68- 74.) Two of the earliest monthly statements have the added
notation in the Activity section "Phone Pymt Svc Fee-Col Salt Lake City UT." (R. 72 & 73.)
These notations memorialize Internet payments made by Mr. Shaw from his home in Texas
and the charging of service fees by Advanta, apparently at its office in Utah. (R. 154, 155,
158 & 168.) The trial court considered this argument and ruled:
"However, based on the plain language of the Agreement, that argument fails.
As noted above, even if a payment could be tendered at another location, those
payments were only deemed effective when Advanta received the payment at
the Pennsylvania address specified in the Agreement. In light of that clear
provision, it is evident that Shaw's ultimate obligation was required to be
performed in Pennsylvania." (R. at 400.)
The trial court was correct. The clear language of the Advanta credit card agreement
controlled. There was no bona fide fact issue. Mr. Shaw did not change the terms of the
agreement, nor did Advanta unilaterally change the agreement by noting his Internet payment
in the "Activities" portion of the four monthly statements. The address on the monthly
statements for the place of payment was never changed from the Pennsylvania address. That
specific address, "Advanta Bank Corp, PO Box 8088, Philadelphia, PA 19101-088", was
directly under the words "Make Payment To:". (R. 68-81 and Exhibit "C".) The credit card
@

agreement was never changed. It always required payment to be received at the specific
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Pennsylvania address before the payment was effective regardless of where the payment was
tendered.
The lack of merit to Federated' s argument is further demonstrated by the fact that no
address is listed in the language in the "Activities" section to which Federated now argues
is a new Utah address for payment. (,I 6 or the card agreement required a specific address to
which payments were to be sent and no payment was effective until received at that address.)
Yet, in each of the questioned monthly statements, the same detailed Pennsylvania address
appears right under the language "Make Payment To." Federated also argues that Advanta
had the right to change the terms of the credit card agreement and that it did so by the "UT"
notation in the "Activities" section of four early monthly statements. Yet, the credit card
agreement set out a specific way that the agreement was amended. It was amended by a
specific notice sent to the card holder modifying the agreement's terms. See

,r

12 of

agreement (R. at 11, Exhibit "B".) The monthly statement is not such a notice. The monthly
statements, and their purpose as billing statements, are identified in a separate paragraph of
the agreement; ,I 13. Id.
The fallacy of Federated's argument is further highlighted by the fact that the last
monthly statements sent to Mr. Shaw do not have the Utah notations in their activity section.
(R. 7 5-80 and Exhibit "C".) The only address listed on these statements is the Pennsylvania
address right under the language "Make Payment To." Thus, if the logic and argument of
Federated is followed, the missing notation of "UT" in the activity section of the later
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statements means that Advanta and Mr. Shaw changed the place of performance back to
Pennsylvania, the state of the only address on the latter monthly statements (and on all of the
statements). There is no fact issue barring summary judgment given the clear language of the
agreement and the specific Pennsylvania address noted on every monthly statement.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
The district court awarded attorney's fees, litigation expenses and court costs to Mr.
Shaw based upon the provisions of the subject credit card agreement and the Utah Reciprocal
Attorney Fee statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. He requests that the Court remand the
@

case to the district court for an award of his attorney's fees, litigation expenses and court
costs incurred on appeal

CONCLUSION
The Court should deny the appeal of Federated and remand to the district court for a
determination and award of the attorney's fees, litigation expenses and court costs incurred
in this appeal.

CERTIFICATION
The undersigned certifies that there are 13,937 words in the required portions of the
brief, within the 14,000 word limitation of Rule 24(f)(l)( C).
Dated this 2nd day of April, 2017.

ster A. Perry
ttorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDUM
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Federated Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment- Shaw Case.

B.

Advanta Credit Card Agreement.

C.

Monthly Statements.

D.

Trial Court Written Decision.

E.

Summary Judgment.
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Federated Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment- Libby Case.

G.

Utah Borrowing Statute.

H.

Pennsylvania Statute of Limitations on Written Contracts.
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CHRISTOPHER C. HILL

FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION
Utah Bar Number 9583
10 Exchange Pl., Ste. 527
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ph: (248) 737-1300
Fx: (248) 406-8053
chill@fedcap.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FEDERATED CAPITAL
CORPORATION d/b/a FEDERATED
FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMESNSHAW

d/b/a ALPHA BLINDS DIST,
Defendant(s).

Case No.: 139910356

Judge: D.C.

Plaintiff Federated Capital Corporation d/b/a Federated Financial Corporation of America

("Plaintiff or Federated''), by and through its counsel of record, hereby files its Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment - Statute of Limitations and Fraud on

the Court - and Motiop. for an Award of Attorney's Fees ("Motion for Summary Judgment").
An Affidavit of Patrick David ('~Affidavit") in support of this memorandum is filed concurrently
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herewith and is incorporated by reference herein.
Defendant James N Shaw d/b/a Alpha Blinds ("Defendant") has moved for summary
judgment in this matter arguing that this case should be dismissed because Plaintiffs cause of
action for breach of a certain agreement between the Parties was not brought within the period

required by the appropriate statute of limitations, the Plaintiff has committed a fraud on the
court, and that the Court should award Defendant attomey's fees and costs. Despite the
arguments made by Defendant, the Court should de11y the relief sought because of the reasons
discussed in detail below.
In this case, Defendant is requesting that this Com1 rely on Utah Code section 78B-2-103

(the "Borrowing Statute") and Financial Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), to dismiss Federated Capital's claims. The BotTowing Statute by its plain
terms is inapplicable to this case and may not serve as a basis for rewriting the contract between
the parties. Likewise, the comt of appeals' decision in Pingree applies in limited circumstances
not relevant to these proceedings. It is distinguishable. The law and the facts support that
G@

Federated timely commenced the proceedings in this case by filing a Complaint within the time
fixed by the applicable Utah statute of limitations. Therefore, it would be error to enter summary
judgment against Plaintiff.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Federated alleges that the defendant had a credit card account with Advanta

under the account agreement attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A" thereto. See generally

,iii

I, 5 & 6, Complaint and its Exhibit "A which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
2
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Response: Admit. Defendant entered into a commercial contract ("Agreement") with

Advanta Bank Corp. ("Advanta") by applying for and obtaining a credit card from Advanta. See
Affidavit of Patrick David ("Affidavit"), which is filed concurrently herewith; see also
Application, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
2.

Federated alleges that the account was assigned to it· by Advanta.

See

~

7,

Complaint.
Response: The document referenced in this paragraph speaks for itself. Inasmuch as this

statement of fact does not contradict that document, Plaintiff admits the same.
3.

Federated produced selected monthly statements on the account in its initial

disclosures. They are attached hereto as Exhibit "B". The statements indicated that the account
was in default in March 2007. Federated received the account from Advanta on April 10, 2008
according to the Bill of Sale produced by Federated in its initial disclosures. The Bill of Sale is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C ". Thus, the account was allegedly assigned to Federated after it
was in default.
Response: The documents referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves. Inasmuch

as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same.
4.

The plaintiff is not a citizen of Utah, but is a Michigan corporation with its place

of business in Farmington Hills, Michigan. See print out of Federated's registration with the
Utah Department of commerce, Division of Corporations attached hereto as Exhibit "D" hereto.
Judicial Notice.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00112

Response:

Plaintiff was incorporated in Michigan.

Plaintiff also has an office and

employees located in Salt Lake City, Utah. The documents referenced in this paragraph speak
for themselves. Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff

admits the same.
5.

The Account Agreement attached to the plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit "A ", and

attached hereto as Exhibit "A ··, states that the defendant is to make payment on the account at
the address indicated on the Advanla monthly statements.
a. See

~

6, "You agree to make all pavments . .. to us {Advantal at the location

and in the manner specified on your periodic.billing statement . .. "
b. See also, towards the end of~ 6, "Account payments are to be mailed to the
address for payments shown on vour periodic billing statement.

Payment

must be received by us at that address on or before the specified time on that
Payment Due Date stated on your periodic billing statement, and must
conform to any specific requirements for making payment which appear with
or in your billing statement. Pavments tendered to and accepted by us or our
agent at a location other than the address stated on your periodic billing
statement are not effective until received by us at the address specified. "
~

Response: The documents referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves. Inasmuch

as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same. The
Business Card Agreement also states, "You agree to make all payments in US Dollars payable

through a US financial institution, either by check or money order payable to us at the location

4
~
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and in the manner specified on your periodic billing statement or in any other manner (such as

by electronic fund transfer or wire transfer) that we agree to and provide procedures for."
See, 6, Exhibit "2" attached hereto. In this situation, Defendant made electronic payments over

the phone which only went to Salt Lake City, Utah, not to Pennsylvania. See Exhibit "6"
attached hereto. That is because this was an agreed upon procedure which Advanta provided to
its customers. Additionally, the agreement states, "Payments tendered to and accepted by us or
our agent at a location other than the address stated on your periodic billing statement are
not effective until received bv us at the address specified." (Emphasis added).

6.

Advanta selected Philadelphia, Pennslyvania as the place that payments were to

be sent on each and every monthly account statement. See monthly statement attached to the
Complaint as Exhibit "B,, and attached hereto as Exhibit "B ".
Response: The documents referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves. Inasmuch

as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same. The
Business Card Agreement also states, "You agree to make all payments in US Dollars payable
through a US financial institution, either by check or money order payable to us at the location
and in the manner specified on your periodic billing statement or in any other manner {such as

by electronic fund transfer or wire transfer) that we agree to and provide procedures for."
See16, Exhibit "2" attached hereto. In this situation, Defendant made some electronic payments
over the phone which only went to Salt Lake City, Utah, not to Pennsylvania. See Exhibit "6"
attached hereto. That is because this was an agreed upon procedure which Advanta provided to
its customers. Additionally, the agreement states, "Payments tendered to and accepted by us or

5
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our agent at a location other than the address stated on vour periodic billing statement are
not effective until received bv us at the address specified. " (Emphasis added).

7.

This case was filed on .fune 11, 2013 and service of the Summons and Complaint

was thereafter made on June 4, 2013. Judicial notice ofcourt docket.
Response: Admitted.

8.

On June 11, 2013, Judge Toomey issued a memorandum decision in Federated

Capital v. Libbv. Civil No. 129914062, Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
dismissing an identical Federated collection case of an Advanta credit card as being barred by
the statute of limitations. Ajudgment was entered against Federated on July 7, 2013, dismissing
the case and awarding attorney's fees to Mr. Libby. A copy of the Memorandum Decision is
attached hereto as Exhibit "E".
Response: The documents referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves. Inasmuch
as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same.
Defendant fails to explain the entire circumstances surrounding the Libby case. After the Order
was issues by Judge Toomey, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial based on an error of law.

This motion was fully pied and oral argument was heard on December 12, 2013.
9.

On July JO, 2013, Judge Toomey issued a memorandum decision in Federated

Capital v. Chapa, Civil No. 129911232, Third District Court ofSalt Lake County, State of Utah,
dismissing another Federated collection case of an Advanta credit card as being barred by the
statute of limitations. A judgment was entered against Federated on July 23, 2013, dismissing
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the case and awarding attorney's fees to Ms. Chapa. A copy of the Memorandum Decision is
attached hereto as Exhibit "F".

Response: The documents referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves. Inasmuch
as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same.
Defendant fails to explain the entire circumstances surrounding the Chapa case. After the Order
was issues by Judge Toomey, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial on July 30, 2013, based on
an error of law. No decision has been rendered in this matter.
10.

On November 15, 2013, Judge Stone issued a decisionfiwn the bench in Liberty

Acquisitions Servicing. LLC v. Nelson. Civil No. J39900334, Third District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, dismissing the collection of an HSBC credit card account purchased by
Liberty Acquisitions as part of a portfolio of the HSBC credit card debt and awarding attorney's
fees against Liberty. The basis of the dismissal was that the suit was barred by the statute of
limitations on the same grounds that the statute barred the Federated cases before Judge
Toomey. Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" is a copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Lmv
and Judgment signed by Judge Kennedy.

Response: The documents referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves. Inasmuch
as this statement of fact d~es not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same.

Furthermore, the facts of the Liberty Acquisition case are completely different from the

Federated cases. The contract in the Liberty Acquisition case does not contain a choice of venue
provision, which the Federated cases and agreements do. This is an important distinction and
one which Defendant failed to inform the Court about.
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~

11.

After Judge Toomey issued her two memorandum decisions and entered the two

judgments against Federated, Federated changed the allegations of its Complaint used in
collection cases on Advanta credit card debt. The new Complaint is the one used in the case at
bar. Among the new or modified a/legations is paragraph 4: "Furthermore, Plaintiff's causes of
action are based upon a writing.

Hence, the applicable statute is Utah Code Ann. 178B-Z-

309(2), which states, in pertinent part, that "[ajn action may be brought within six years . .. (2)
upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing[]"
Response:

The Complaint filed in this case speaks for itself.

Defendant has no

infonnation nor knowledge as to when or why any modifications were made to the language
used in the Federated complaints. Defendant does not have personal knowledge to testify to this
broad statement.

ADDITIONAL FACTS
1.

Defendant entered into a commercial contract C'Agreement") with Advanta Bank

Corp. ("Advanta") by applying ~or and obtaining a credit card from Advanta. See Affidavit of

Patrick David ("Affidavit"), which is filed concurrently herewith; see also Application, which is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
2.

On or about February 20, 2003, an application for a credit card account was

requested by Defendant ("Applicationn). See Exhibit 1.
3.

The Application was approved and a credit card was issued under the business

name of Aone Media Inc, with the signing individual's name being that of Defendant, and
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assigned the following identification number: 5475-8433-1441-0018 ('~Account"). See Exhibit 1.

See also Affidavit.
4.

Upon applying for and using the Account, Defendant agreed that he would be

governed by the terms and conditions found in the Business Card Agreement. Copies of the
relevant Business Card Agreements, dated 2003 (year of Application) and 2007 (year debt was
charged off) are attached hereto as Exhibit 2. See also Exhibit 1 and Affidavit.
5.

Plaintiff is an assignee of Advanta and is duly authorized and has all rights in and

to Defendant's obligation to pay sums due on the Account and has all of the rights, powers and
authority to enforce the terms and conditions that govern or have governed the Account. See
Affidavit; see also Bill of Sale, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 3; see also Redacted Pool of
Assets, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 4; see also Charge-Off Statement, which is attached
hereto as Exhibit 5; see also Exhibit 2 at~ 23 ("We may sell or assign any or all of our rights
and obligations in the Account, and/or this agreement without notice."
6.

Defendant took advantage of the Account by making purchases. See Statements,
~

which are attached hereto as Exhibit 6.
7.

Defendant's last payment on the Account was on June 30, 2007, in the amount of

$672.00. See July 24, 2007, Statement which is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.
8.

Defendant js in default of his obligation to repay the amounts due on the Account

because he has not made payments as required by the Agreement. See Affidavit; see also Exhibit
4; see also Exhibit 5.
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9.

Defendant owes the principal sum of $25,901.76, plus interest calculated at

34.99% from January 31, 2008. See Exhibit 5.
10.

The Agreement states that any party that files a lawsuit pertaining to the

Agreement must sue only in Utah applying Utah law:

31. CONTROLLING LAW AND JURISDICTION. This Agreement shall
be governed· solely by and interpreted entirely in accordance with the laws
of the State of Utah, ... regardless of where you reside or where the
Business is located. We process the Account application, make the
decision to open the Account and advance credit for you from our Utah
offices .... YOU CONSENT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH AND AGREE THAT
ANY LAWSUIT PERTAINfNG TO THE ACCOUNT MUST BE
BROUGHT ONLY IN SUCH COURTS IN UTAH, REGARDLESS OF
WHO FILES THE SUIT, AND MAY BE MAINTAINED ONLY IN
THOSE COURTS UNLESS AND UNTIL ANY PARTY ELECTS
ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IN
THIS AGREEMENT.

See Exhibit 2 at § 31.
I 1.

An additional term of the Agreement, on which Defendant's Motion relies,

discuss tem1s of payment:
6. PAYMENT: We may process your payment check by electronically
debiting your account at your bank for your check amount and
transmitting check information (such as check amount, routing number
and check number), or a digital image of the check, or some other
substitute instrument, rather than the actual check, to your bank, and your
bank's record of that payment may appear as an automatic debit, substitute
check or other electronic transaction rather than a negotiated paper check).
. . .. If you pay in installments, you must pay at least the minimum
payments shown on your periodic billing statement ..... Account payments
are to be mailed to the address for payment shown on your periodic billing
statement. Payment must be received by us at that address on or before the
specified time on the Payment Due Date stated on your periodic billing
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statement, and must conform to any specific requirements for making
payment which appear with or in your billing statement. ....

Id at§ 6.

ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Based on the following, Defendant has failed to show that she is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A.

The Forum-Selection Clause of the Agreement Governs in This Case.
Because the Agreement between the parties requires Federated Capital to bring suit in

Utah, Federated Capital, as well as Defendant, is prevented from bringing suit against Defendant

in Pennsylvania or in any other state. Federated Capital is not prevented from bringing suit in
Pennsylvania because of the statute of limitations of that state. Indeed, the Pennsylvania statute
of limitations is irrelevant. As set forth below, the forum-selection clause in the Agreement

applies here; Utah's Borrowing Statute does not.
1.

Forum-Selection Clauses Are Valid and Enforceable.

A district court is "not at liberty to ignore the contractual agreement between the parties.''

Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Sporl, 2000 UT App 195, * 1, 2000 WL 33244138. In this case,
an Agreement existed between Federated Capital and Defendant. The Agreement contained a
forum-selection clause specifying that Utah procedural law governs this case. Under Utah law, a
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forum-selection clause is valid and enforceable. It '\vill be given effect unless it is unfair or
unreasonable." Coombs v. Juice Works Dev. Inc., 2003 UT App 388, 1 9, 81 P.3d 769~ id.

,rift 0,

12 (a forum selection clause is valid even ifit is non-negotiable). The Coombs case is instructive.

In Coombs, the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with an Arkansas corporation to open
a Juice Works franchise in Utah. When the franchise failed, the plaintiffs filed suit in Utah
against the franchisor and an affiliated corporation. Id.

1~ 2-4. The defendants made a motjon to

dismiss because the forum-selection clause in the agreement required the plaintiffs to bring suit
in Arkansas. Id. The plaintiffs opposed the motion on the grounds that they were located in Utah,
they opened the franchise in Utah, they had never been to Arkansas, the contract was not
~

negotiated in Arkansas, and the franchisor had been purchased by a corporation with offices in
Utah. Id. The district court and the court of appeals were not persuaded. The court of appeals
ruled that a party who seeks to escape the forum-selection clause of a contract must first show
that the clause is unfair and unreasonable. Id.

~1

9-10. Because the plaintiffs were unable to

make that showing in Coombs, the forum-selection clause was valid and enforceable. Id. 117.
A forum-selection clause binds the parties to the procedural law of the forum. This is true
because "matters of procedure in a contract action are ... governed by the law of the forum."

Trillium USA, 2001 UT 101,
~

1 14 (ellipses in original); see

Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar

Co., 2002 UT 69, 120, 54 P.3d 1054 (Utah will apply its own procedural rules, even when it
applies the substantive law of another jurisdiction). Statutes of limitations are procedural rules.

Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1993). "Therefore, as a general rule, Utah's statutes of
limitations apply to actions brought in Utah." Pingree, 880 P.2d at 16. This court should look to
12
~
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the Agreement and the forum-selection clause to apply the Utah statute of limitations here.

2.

Utah's Borrowing Statute Should Not Be Construed to Rewrite
the Forum-Selection Clause of the Agreement.

While a forum-selection clause binds the parties to the procedural law of the forum,
Utah's Borrowing Statute operates to bar an action in Utah if two conditions are satisfied: the
action is barred if it arose "in another jurisdiction" and "is not actionable in the other jurisdiction

by reason of the lapse of time." 1 Utah Code. § 78B-2- l 03. By its plain te1ms, the statute is
directed at the situation where a party seeks to present a claim in Utah because the party is
specifically prevented by an expired statute of limitations from presenting the claim in the
jurisdiction where it arose. Van de Grift v. State, 2013 UT 11, ,i 9, 299 P.3d 1043 (court will

~

consider the plain language of a statute). In such a case, Utah's Borrowing Statute prevents
plaintiffs from taking advantage of Utah's limitations provisions. Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d
343, 351 (Utah 1980). Put simply, borrowing statutes are designed "to prevent shopping for the
most favorable forum." Hu.ffington v. T.C. Grp., LLC, CIV.A,. No. N11C-01-030JR, 2012 WL
1415930, at *7 (Del. Super. Apr. 18, 2012).
~

In this case, the Borrowing Statute does not apply. Indeed, the reason Federated Capital
did not bring suit in Pennsylvania is simple: Federated Capital-like Defendant-is bound by the
forum-selection clause in the Agreement. The clause required the parties to bring suit in Utah
and supports application of Utah procedural law to the cause of action. Whether the

I In full. Utah's Borrowing Statute provides as follows: ..A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not actionable
in the other jurisdiction by reason of the.lapse of time, may not be pursued in this state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state
who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued." Utah Code§ 788-2-103.
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Pennsylvania statute of limitations would have barred the action is inelevant.
Moreover, this case is governed not by the Borrowing Statute but by the more specific
statute of limitations dealing with an action based on a written contract. See e.g., Simpson v. U.S.,
Gjj

435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978) (precedence should be given to a specific statute over a general statute),
superseded on other grounds by statute. Utah statutory law states that an action "may be brought
within six years ... upon any contract ... founded upon an instrument in writing, except those
mentioned in Section 78B-2-3 l 1." Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-309(2). The exception contained in
Section 78B-2-311 is not applicable here. Thus, based on the law of the forum, the Utah statute
of limitations for Federated Capital's action against Defendant is six years.

3.

If the Court Applies the Borrowing Statute Here. It Will Allow
Defendant to Forum Shop.

Utah courts have not applied the Borrowing Statute to rewrite a forum-selection provision
in a contract between parties as is being sought here by Defendant.- Indeed, to apply the provision
as Defendant is requesting would encourage the very forum shopping that borrO\.ving statutes
seek to discourage and it would deprive Federated Capital of "the benefit of [its] bargain which
includes the forum-selection clause." Coombs, 2003 UT App 388,

,r

15 (internal quotations

omitted).
In this case, Defendant defaulted on the Account in an amount in excess of $8,000.00,
and now seeks to avoid his obligations under the Agreement by asserting that Federated Capital
engaged in a game of "pick and choose" for the statute of limitations. But both parties were
bound by the forum-selection clause. Just as that clause has prevented Federated Capital from
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forum shopping, it likewise prevents Defendant from fo11.1m shopping. If the tables had been
turned and Utah had recognized a shotter limitations period for a contract claim and
Pennsylvania had recognized a longer period, Federated Capital would not be at liberty to ignore
the forum-selection clause and bring suit in Pennsylvania. See O'Hara v. First Liberty Ins.
Co,p., 984 A.2d 938, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (forum-selection clauses are valid and

enforceable in Pennsylvania). A Pennsylvania court likely would decide that an action could not
be brought in that state because the court could not exercise jurisdiction over it by nature of the
fornm-selection clause. Defendant should not be allowed to escape the fornm-selection clause
here.
Moreover, the parties, the Account, and the Agreement have a significant relationship to

~

Utah. First, Utah public records show that Federated Capital's predecessor, Advanta, was
incorporated in Utah. Second, Advanta had offices in Utah. Third, Federated Capital is duly
~

licensed to do business in Utah and has offices in Salt Lake City. Fourth, at the time of the
Agreement, the parties acknowledged that Advanta processed the Account application in Utah.
(Exhibit 2). Fifth, Advanta made decisions about the Account in Utah. (Id.). Sixth, Advanta
advanced credit to Defendant from the Utah offices. (Id.). Seventh, Defendant transfen-ed
payments electronically to Advanta's offices in Utah pursuant to Advanta procedures. (Exhibit
6). Eighth, the Agreement specifies that the parties' contractual rights shall be enforced in Utah.

(Id.). Ninth, the parties agreed that Utah substantive law applied to govern the Agreement and
they agreed to Utah as the fomm. (Exhibit 2). Because Utah courts give effect to forum-selection
clauses in agreements, the Borrowing Statute should not be construed to displace the parties'
15
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contractual rights. See Burns v. Astrue, 2012 UT 71,

1 11, 289

P.3d 551 (court avoids absurd

results when interpreting Utah statutes).
B.

Because the Agreement Contains a Forum-Selection Clause, Pingree Is Not
Applicable and Does Not Alter the Parties' Agreement to Apply Utah's Six-Year
Statute of Limitations.

Financial Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) is
distinguishable from this case. In Pingree the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a funding
contract, which contained a choice-of-law provision but did not contain a fomm-selection clause.
The choice-of-law provision stated the parties would be bound by Califomia substantive law.

880 P.2d at 16.
Within months, defendant Pingree breached the contract by failing to make payment. Id.
Almost six years later, plaintiff Financial filed suit in Utah for breach of contract. Id. The
applicable statute of limitations in Utah was six years, and the applicable statute of limitations in
California was four years. Id. Pingree made a motion and the district court dismissed the suit as
time-barred under California law. Financial appealed. The question on appeal was whether
Utah's longer or California's shorter statute oflimitations applied to Financial's claim. Id

The court of appeals began the analysis by noting the general mle in contract law that
"matters of procedure [are] governed by the law of the forum," and "limitation periods are
generally procedural in nature." Id The court recognized an exception to the rule ·with the
Borrowing Statute, which bars a cause of action that "has arisen in another state" but has been

16
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brought in Utah to take advantage of Utah's longer statute of limitations. Id. at 17.

2

The court
~

stated that "[u]nless the contract states otherwiset a cause of action for a breach of contract
generally arises where the contract is to be performed." Id ( emphasis added). In Pingree, the
only perfonnance remaining under the contract was payment. Id. Moreover, the contract was
silent both with respect to place of payment and with respect to forum selection. Thus, in
assessing which forum law applied, the comt presumed payment would be made in Financial's
place of business, which was California. Id. The court then concluded that performance and
cause of action arose in California, and the California statute of limitations applied. Id.

3

Notably, if the contract in Pingree had contained a forum-selection clause, the court of
appeals' performance/cause-:-of-action analysis would have been unnecessary. As discussed
above, by its plain language, the Borrowing Statute does not apply if the parties agree to a

pru1icular forum and the procedural law. The court of appeals recognized as much in Pingree
when it held that a cause of action for breach of contract arises where performance is to take
place "[u]nless the contract states otherwise." Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
In this case, the Agreement states otherwise. Unlike Pingree, the parties' Agreement in
this case contained a forum-selection clause under which the parties consented to personal
2

The language of the Borrowing Statute has changed slightly since Ping1:ee was decided, but
it is substantively the same. See Utah Code § 78-12-45 (1992) ("When a cause of action has
arisen in another state or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the laws thereof an action
thereo11 cannot there be maintained against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an action
thereon shall not be maintained against him in this state, except in favor of one who has been a
citizen of this state and who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued.").
3

The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether a California tolling
provision applied to toll the statute of limitations for Financial. Pingree, 880 P .2d at 17-18.
17
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jurisdiction in Utah courts, and they agreed that any suit pertaining to the Account would be
brought and maintained in Utah courts. (Exhibit 2). That distinction is critical. Pingree involved
the precise type of forum-shopping that the Borrowing Statute was designed to prevent.
Federated Capital has not engaged in forum shopping here. It has abided by the terms of the
Agreement. Moreover, Defendant has not challenged the enforceability of the forum-selection
clause. There is no question that Utah's procedural rules govern Federated Capital's claim.

C.

Because Summary Judgment is Not Appropriate, the Court Should Not Award
Attornev's Fees or Costs.
Because the Court should deny Defendant's Motion, the Court should also not award

attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Utah's Reciprocal Attorney's Fee statute (the "Statute").
However, if the Court grants Defendant's Motion, the award of Attorneys' fees and cost is not
automatic or mandatory, but is discretionary.
The Statute provides that a court "may" award attomey fees and costs to prevailing pa11y
in any action based upon a written contract if the contract allows at least one party to recover
attorney fees. Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041, 1046 (Utah 2007), rehearing denie(j; Giusti v.

Sterling Wentworth Corp., 201 PJd 966 (Utah 2009). Whether attorney fees should be awarded
under the Statute
~

involves a policy~driven analysis subject to the district court's

discretion. Hooban v. Unicity Intern., Inc., 220 P.3d 485, 488 (Utah App. 2009), certiorari

granted 225 P .3d 880, affirmed 285 P .3d 766.
The Statute is applied on a case-by-case basis in order to determine which pa1ty
"prevailed'~ and, thus, may be entitled to an award under the Statute. Anderson & Karrenberg v.
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Jerry Warnick, 289 P.3d 600, 604 (Utah App. 2012). This approach affords the trial court the
~

flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or neither, parties may be considered to have
prevailed. Id In furthering the policies behind the Statute, it has been stressed that courts should
also base their decisions with equitable and common sense principles. A.K. & R. Whipple

~

Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 94 P.3d 270,277 (Utah 2004); J Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud,

116 P .3d 353, 356 (Utah 2005). In fact, the courts should avoid using the Statute if its use would
result in a windfall to the other party. Bilanzich, 160 P.3d at 1047.
Here, Defendant admits that he failed to pay as he agreed and now s·eeks relief from this
Court on procedural grounds to not honor his previous agreement. If the Court were to award
reasonable fees and costs, Defendant would completely avoid any liability on a legitimate debt
that he incurred in the principal amount of $25,901.76. Furthermore, Plaintiff has asserted the
action on goods merits and in good faith according to the terms of the Agreement. Accordingly,
~

in the event that Defendant's Motion is granted, she should not also be awarded attorneys' fees
and costs.

CONCLUSION
The parties agreed to be bound by Utah substantive law and by Utah's procedural law.
The Borrowing Statute and Pingree do not bar Federated Capital's claims. Federated Capital

respectfully asks this Court to deny Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

19
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DATED this 18 th day of February, 2014.

/s/ CHRISTOPHER C. HILL
CHRISTOPHER C. HILL

Attorney for Plaintiff
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mght.tE ~ to iJimrto the absente_.Qf 1hi$ ~rn aamfon.)QJ ~ ta m t ~ fhatwe ~
11mil ~ t o 1fme or payJJrent e r ~ rt pai~·that in my~ may fmpair my ri OU'~ tn1er tis
Fgmnent. ~~ c:mmtor.~ tr,us y,il be effedile'lilless ltt fn mfr; aoo sigmf bymraulflmzed
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C2) ~:mamt~fspastdue;pm~~fil!Snmorgesweeler:ttl.lndlD!..lt1heNeutBalara
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ctmJe·~nmroom pa,,mttmeb'qb1t,J~badffereritrnritun ~aiJ!dh:hm1le•
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00009

[v(.:n f}c:.._r,JL ~\ t:-r

~
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i;~~~M~x:~fGr~e;'itlr~~Jarur/.~ ~Js1he tililg

~o. BlENTS OF=)fu a-e fn

~:~~if

81¥ Gffi.~g occu: ·~ )'tlJ CD not
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1ega1 piixt!ssto tabm:refotyim rn <n IXJSS~ to~ ircMde mwih ~tasetr~~ rtama1m
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the credit Uml tio!d u set oot ~ ~9lc!Ph· B; ~ ~ _lOI' ~ P1tiec1b1 w'Dr ~ ~
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~kd:di-g-~inilation). ~ttmaffect~~oo~•tees2fldlcr.
imro! dtaigBS as~ as·~ tat a:111El# ~ rrt cfre¢J rea!ed t o . ~ .sm~ qJ01l 'MiUmi ~ as·reglired_ b y ~ tJw,Pcy ~2trieooed oraai=.fee, tf1clrge.
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eJed:mJtto serd a~.od'cst11!mentfa':~ b1fioacyclain•ttuw k_oo detltct~balance.
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hCred"tUmlatanytineuimsandilgmlmnnotke ~ywatitat&,t:axtess~'tl\'liat!JtXrecmii.~

nab Med notbe i1 ~ . and reoantess cf1Mll!tt12f}(ll ma tnct!ral.ftmdecihlsAgreementYcu-~:
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bo·teama mil:d er tnlXiflCd ~ . If thekt:D.d.1 s . ~ Q'.1he:0d Limit
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~it_to)riuatlhelast~~to~~~oncu-reams.~aspiltrlarsbJc:JSng
stah!nmt:or0{Jlerwist?.. Mriolices ~'Ule.Accimtcan beQM?n 1D q ~ M f ( when gwm
2fi! effeclive astoal Cardmffllbm, ax! anyac&n 1ak!!tl o r ~ made by.any $U:h·Calttnembersh!l
tmd al1 Carrltnembett..
.
.
. .. .
. ..
.
'
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offers and/or }JOU" appfcalion for and/or usa of a1y at those fealuresi products, seivicas er estrancemoom, to tie
mz:,Jmt;m degree permill.ed byappr,cabte lavi. lfyou elect1D app!lj1br aracteptcr use anyctltlefcrego'filg t,hk:h irv:obres
charging a premium, fee or chaiye to 'f'..JJAa:cunt ~:melher yru do so by ~ J !lllSenfing. er by failing 1a "opt out"
or~I ~ an irnroc!uci)ry orJll)motiona penoo, crqlhenusa),you rutrotte us to postmtcharg;! 1a ~Ao:ottt
~ acy of the foregoing oove thepaymentorEtrcirtl of anyrebale, ra.Yaror b ~
J?im crolher~ li\ralre

p-em:wn.

b~ orcn yru-behalf oron~Accourl~yau aclro:kdg~ and agree that\~ have ri0 ratnyfcrany~wttcll may
be as:.essed en any of thOS3 ttam of varw or <1n tie P<tflll°..nt er aviorc1 prrA:eSS anj that j'OU should CDOStJlt your tax
acMsoras to the pro~12x~of any st.d1 items.
.
29. CHEDIT PROTECTION A~ID CRBJiTINSURANCE:lf you choose to beccme enrolled under aCreditPro~

or credit Insurance plan madg awilahJe from USa our affifia1B or a'!hid part;, an amer.dment 1D 1his Agreement Uor
Credit Protection) or a Certificate ot Insurance wil be Issued to you. You 2gre2 that the apµ1cabla month¥ charge or
premium may be·charged to~ AccounL ThB dt2rge or premium will be compmed as ptDlitted 1he Credit

a

Protecfun er Credit murance pl&l and will be reO~ctad oo your pP.ricdlc b!Bing statement ~ ycu. fai to make lhe
reqci{ed payment on yea Account fur a predetermined number ct consecutive biling cydes; ttiis Cradit Protedion
or Cro...d'rt Insurance ffia'J te cancefed. Yoo unrle£stmd that the pcrc:lme of Credit Protec!lco or ·Credit lnsuranca is
vo!untruy and is not requlred fa1he extension of credit (altoough we fTI.=Y cqnsxferymr rnterast and/or partidpafion
rn wch plans in eva.'Uating your requests for creat and your Ao:oorit status), that we or ot.'t' 2.lliale may receive a
commission or olher payment er benefit in cooneciicn wah the puthase, that we have no 1idlrlaly or other duty to
you in coonecticn with MY aspect of 1he pufcllase or.lhe OJVerage, and that YoU should consill your tax advise{ as
1o the proper tax1raatment at any benefits ra:aived under any such p!an.
~a. SPECIAL PROGRAMS: From 5me 1o time we may o!ferSp;clai Prog,-dllS (such as apmmolion~ (llerest rate er
fee W2i\'riron cerein mactions, or ill!! prM!ege of sl<ipping a~oi'c payment; or paitic~ in Cash Back or olher
rawarns pn:grarns} on 1he.AccountN:nna!Pcrountfees. charges and o!hert,ms a~fyb any Special Program t.nl~
fncoiismtwitfl 1m partictJtar~ or rules a~ra to a Spacaf F ~ offaing. Toe fEaluBs and rules or~
proyrams ITGY\121:Y frnm lime~ 1irru!. and 1..e of lteJla:quntinoccordMce with !he feai'\res or rules ofaSpeciaJ Program
constitutesagreementt:l ttmse features atd rulesv.fflmfarnal Jnldcatic:t arart\!!nd"nent1o lhisAg,"l!ement. (Althcugh
Sp;dal Prcgram fealures atd rures, frdu:iinu ~vitiout rrrJanimJ Cash Back and ofier ~ prog-am "'2s, ara not
terms or 1hls ft.greement, tey are related ta 1lle use of
Accoont so as lo ba coiered by 1.he ft.rtitraticn provisions
in Paragraphs 3S and 36.) If art/ of !he for~bg invo!ve the payment or award af any iaiate.. revmm. benefi~
premit.11\ prize or o:her aems or va[qe to )'Otl or on your behal er on :,wr Acttiwlt, YctJ acmowfed~ and agree

,w

thatwa have no llab00yforany2<2Swhlch rr.a.yb~assessed on anyofthose ~ cf\12Jlle oron the pa,Jmentcraward
precess Sl)ci tt1atyou ~:d ccnst..i yctttax adisor as \o the properta:<treatmenrof arusuch items.
31. CONTROLLING Lll.W AND JURISDlCTION: We are a bank chartered by, and locatsg in, 1he State of Utah.
This Agreement sh311 be governed sclei'y by and interpre!ed en~ly in acconiance with the laws or lt.e State of Utah,
eca..pt as {and to ~ degree fhaij such laws are supecseded by 1he banl<ing or other laws of the Unifa:I States.
regarofess of where you reside or Where the 8tJs!Mss· ls lo:ated. You agree 1hat all ~ conditions, aitd other
prov[sfons rafatlng_ to ~ method of detenninilg 1hs ~ce·upon which 1he interest rate or finance charges are
pfled. and all other terms of thls Agreeaent, are material. to !he terminat1on ct the fnterast rate. YOU. COi.NSENr.] .
PEF50NAL JURISOICnON IN ll-lE 500E ANO FEDERAL ·cOURTS IN t.fCIJ.H ANO AGREE IBAT Nff lAWSUlf
ERTAINlNG TO lliE ACCOUNT Ml.Jsr. BE BROUGHT. OM.Y fll SUCH COURTS tJ UTAH, f\EGAAD~ OF .WHO
il..ES lHE sun; ANO MM .BE MAINTAINED ONLY IN 1\iOSE COURTS Ul\'LESS PNO tJNTILJ,J,.rf PA"1Y.B..ECTS
BrrnATION PUffiUANTTO lHE~iON PROVlStON 1N 1H1S AGREEMENT.
32. SE.VEAABll.ITY!8<ceptforParagraph36whkh hafts own severabJlillJciause.each ~en in1rJsAgreement
91all ba !n!ECp(etEd so as-1D ca effecwe and \'2Ed 1a the nmilrum e:<tert posdle tn!!r' ~pficable Jai.v, and acy prCMSian
woc.h is found ltJ be prohlited or ~id under appllcabfe law shall be deemed inelfeclive only io 1he extent of 1Qat

U

de.

as

prohiblllon orinvaiditY.1hilhoutrnvaDda1ingthe remainderoftre provlslJn cranyolherprouisians ofthsAgreemenl
33= ADDlNG ANO DB.ETING CARDMEMBERS AND DELEGATES: We may ·choose to petmilthe addilion of·
cardmembers oo the AccoUnt other than the Signing lndMdoaJ, and if we do so, 1he refemnc2S rn thfs Agreement
ta such addllian2l Cardmembers apply. You and any other present or proposed Cardmembecs will 1ottow and
complete aft procedures and farms required bi; us 10 add; dsfete or change Canfmernbern. fn th!! ev~ of the
delefion of a Caromember. a minimum of five (5) busir)e~ dc.--ys is· required and you, !fie eusfness and any
non-affected Cammembera will make aU reasonable attempts bl obtain 1he deleted Cardrra!mber's card and ~ d
Convenience Checks. Notwittmiding:\re details of any nolka giwn or olhercommunications. the Signing rnd'Nidual
ar.d the Business.are liable far all Acccunt chalges made by the de!eted Can:rmember unta we haw a reasonable
opportunity fo restrict access to lhe kcount bi; the detered cardmember.
We may aJso choosa to pmtthe use of Delegates on ttieAccount. and \hre do~. the ret~es to Delegates
in lhis Agreement arid In our pi:ocedures apply. (A Delegate is a peraon to whom you assign certalr. administruve
wf<s·wlth respect ta the AccaunQ Ycu and any p~cnt er proposed Delegates will rollo'({,and cornplele all
procedures and fom,.s required by us to add. del!te er change Oefegates1 and \\ill comply With our proceQUres
relating to ihe permitted ac!Maes and olr.er aspects or Oeleg$S as those procedures may pro\Ade from 1Jme to
time, md you are deemEC11D have authoriw:i (and 1herafura to be bound by ar.d Uab!e fo~. aey acUons faken by any
such Oe!egat!!S, lnduding wi1hout lllm1alion any Jl.a:ount fees er ch2rges Incurred. with raspect to lh9Account
34.. CARO REMAINS OUR PROPER'IY: You tnfecstand that each earn issued by us remains our propeey and
we can ravoke your right to uss it at any time. We Ciil do this with or wilhout cause and v.ilh or without giving you
notice. If your Card ls revo.!t."Cf ar a-pires }W must ratum It up~ _our request Also. if the ijusiness or any entity or

\
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person from wl1.om ycu request c:.edt or with whom ,You Intend to make ~ AccolJnt transacUon ~ you lD
suaend.ar an exJ;ired or ~ C2rd you must do so. You may not use the card after It !las ~lred, ailer it has
?CLC~

1

been revo~d. ar after your employment er other coonectim vAl_h tne Business has been ~coolira.led. or after1he

Business ceases to exist arta operate as a gclog coocem.
35. ARBITRAllON DISCLOSURE: By applying for ~t ~th us <X using your Accoon~ yau a~ that tt a
dispute of ~ kind arises out of your appf.ication for credit or out of the ~stence. or use of 'this Agreement. or
your Accoun~ ellher you or we er any o1her party that~ be !Jw01~ can choose to have that~ resolved
by btnding aroitration. If arbl1raticn is chosen, it Will ba conducted pursuant to the -Code. of Procedure of the
National Arbitration forum {the ~ tf you ha\-a cp..lestions about the NAF or v.iant to see its rules cµ1d forms,
you can call the NAF toll-free at 1-800-474--2371 or visit its Website at 1/Ml"J.arbilration-forum.com.. F ~
PAATY TO »ff SUCH OISPUTI: CHOOSES ARBfllWION. NBiliEfl rou NOR WE OR At« OlHER ~ARTY WILL

HAVElliERlGHTTO UTIGAlE ORA?PEAR IN COLRfBEFOREA.l.lOGE ORJURY. ORTO ENGAGclN DISCOVERY
EXCEPT AS PROVDED !N
AAelIBAllON RIJ.ES, OR TO PARUCIPATEPS A.REFRESS'1fATl\JE QR MEMBER
OFPif( a.ASS OFCLAIWMS.. lliEARBITRATOR'S OECISON\WLGENERALLY BEFINALAMl BlNOING. OlHER
• ruGHTS lHATYOU WOULD HAv'E i-J COURf MPY. M.50 NOT BE AVAU.ABlE IN ARBITRATION. rr JS hW!ORTANf
1WU' YOU CAF.EFU.lY REPD 00 UNDERSTAND IBE ARBITAATION P.ROV5!0N (PPAAGRAPH 36 88.0V~
6EFOREAPPl11NG TO US FOR NEW CREDIT OR USING OR CONTINUNGTO W: YOURACCOIM
.
36. ARBrrR.imON PROVISION: M/ dam. cispute or confrr,versy Qt arJ nature
&/helher stated in
coolract, tort or ottieMise. and whether i!WOMng federa[ ~er slate ~ . regulatmy, axnmori law and/or
eqtllf2ble datns) now in e . ~ o;arisifig in the future refaonsrto the·~cr~Agreement or1he relatialshl'ps
!hat led up to \)I" ~ from tHs Agreement. ilcb[i,g &Jithout lkru1a1ion) arr/ claim raalilg to-adwnisemen~
prmrietions, anc:Vor craJ er written slatemenm relating to }alt' Account and/ort:i any applicatrQO fer~ a:u1/or any
prlor agreements between ~ and us, and/or any dam concerning the apr.f1CaQ111'J « validity of: 1his - ~
(with th!! exr:eplfoo noted i1 the Irnpotrant Notes· below concemi,g cianls refamg IX> 1he appllcability ·or validty <r
enfcrceallmfy of all or my por"uDn or this Arnitration Pm¼mt ha matter by or against whcm 1tie cfaim is• made,
vmether by or against erua-i;ru or us ~ (lo the fu3 extent permitted 11/ law] b'J er against any involved thhf pa¢/ or

rne

~er

emp}cyees, agents, representatives or assigrn; ct eilh.er;ut or us _or thatlhfttl Jlaf4' (a •etami~ shall. at 1he elect!oo
of J'OU er us or any sur.h tffid partY. be 1a1fved tr/ biridng amtra!fon ptJISUant to lhis AibiJalion.'Provisbt
conducted by the National Proilralian Forum (the "N.AF). a neural 2lbifrafor.wt(ch Is headtµutBed in Mitne2Pcl°JS;
rifnnoesola and which provides arbllrat!on
nalico.•ide.M aspects of arbilra1lnn puisuantto tt'lisArbilralicn
Provision, including {wilhout limitation) tre selecJicn cif the aroitratcr{s}. shall be condutted urder1he NP~ Coda of
Procedura .fn .effect at the ~me a Claim is filed Orie "Codat wfudi Cede rs i'lcof1]cnted ·hereil bJ reference.
~ r . g anything to the contrarJ con:a.1ed in the Code. for ctr/ C113im !moMng en amount equal toorgreatec
~ $75,000, eilher you <r we or any suqi thief Pa!W may requica:lhat.\he Cfaim be heard by a panel of ~

serr.ces

any

amn,.~AsinQlearbitralll',~
.
dedd!? arrt Cfam fnvoMng an amount!essthan$i5iOOO.}

··

Amibation C2J'I be elected atanyume on aey Cb-im, regarotess cf Yilhe~alawsuithas tan fi'~d in court(unless
that suit Jlas ~ In a]l.!dgemenl}, and a paw Wl1a has asserled a Cl?im fn a lawsµl in <nJrt: may elect
arbi~n \'ffit\ respect to that CJahn ancVor1o any ~ts, subsequen~y ~ rn 1hat !awsul by any~ That
arbltralion praceetrrng can onfy decide your or ou:r Cla!m{s). There Shall be no authority b' .any Claim 1o be
arililra~on a class ?.Ction orrepresentative basis oras~"privale.attom~general" ~andanyarbilralfon under
trus ArbltraUon PtuVis!on ffiq,Y not c o ~ or Join cialn1s of olher persons r.o matter hoW simllar they may be to
your aod/or our Clclm(s). An arbitrator may award a prevawng paey its rses and costs p,rsuant to applkabfe taw.
mJ atbt1rati:m hearing !hat you attend Vtil 1al<a place in the federal Jucicia1 astrict rn wtlldl you reside. N.Af rules
·and forms, fncludlng a schwe of fees1 may be obtained by calling to!{rae at 1-B00-474-2371, er~ \tisiling 1he
N.AFs Website at \\\\IW.atbitratlcn.forum.cotrt Af ymr request, we wil advance 1ha mt $250 of 1he filing arid
hearing fees for any Cafm \Uh you llla'J file against us, Gild v.-e\ovli'~.considerar)y additional requestthatwe
advance 2dcitianal filing and r ~ fees or oth2r costs for yau betaUSe of yoir 1i1anda ~ e s : Toe
arbitrator will dscide whe~r we or you wil ullima!ely be responsible for~g 1hose ff#SS ~d other costs. Ifeittlsr
partf (you or we) fals .to submil to artiilration after aproper demand to do so. tf2t. paty. sha8 hear al of tne ol$lS
and expenses, including. (withot! Umilauon) reasonable affomeys ·fees;~~ by ~ oUier ~ in'.ccmpe!f109

0

aroilration.This Aroitratlon P(Olision relates to a transaclion inyoMng tnteratale ~-and'shall be g~meo ty
the Federal ArbltratronAct, 9 USC 1 ~ . (the-"FAA1. as lt may b~ ~rij from 1frne to Umejhe artl_lratof sha!
apply rele11antJaw and proWje wnnen, reasonable 1incings of fact_ and conct1Jsions·cf mv. as provided by1he Cooe,
and jt.'dgement on an amitralicn ~.'altl may be enterecJ· in ariy cmrt ha\iing i~du:tjon. This Arbitradon Provision

shall SUNive repayment of your ~ ! ' l of credit am termlnalfan of 1P.Jt Account ·
.
lmportmt Not§": tf are/ portX>n of1his,Amlration Pro,nsion is ~eemed invalid or l!lenforceab1e Liufer1he fM or
any other appicabte law or the- code, 1hat fact wm not trmridate 1he ~ . g portions. ot 1hls hbftration.Prmtision1
-tm~f~tf the _JXJ(1ion of thrsAfbilratian Pf1J\DSion ~edinV21ld oruna1fcti:eabfe lncl~the (lRINbitions
on the a<bi!ralion of dafrns on a class ct represertrtNe basis and/ot1he prnfibilions an the consarida&on arjoinder
of similar claimsi 1hen ·this Aroitralian Provismn shal[ be deemed to be invafid and 1Jnenfan:eable fn its ~ . ,aey
claim or d'ispute concawlng h applicablllty or valldity or enfOfC2abilly o: an .or any portion ot tftis ·hbilratic.(\
Prevision. indUdtrg (wfthcut limitaticn) its prolmitions on the erbllratian of claims on dass or represenlative·basis
2nd its prohibitions on the aiosoidaoon or jo!nder of similar claims, shall be heard and ded:I~ only Ir/ a court of
a:impe~ntf~lion ;and not by any arllitt-c&Jr t.'llder this Amltralion Pro'lism; ,
.
.

a

. . 03/07
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FCC23

PAYMENT INFORMATION

ADVANTA

Account Number:

5475 8433 1441 0018

Payment Due Dnte:

NOW DUE

New Dnlance:

21,179.51

Past Due Amount:
Plcnsecheck here ifaddr:ss, phon~ or
e-mail chnngcs nre indicated on reverse side

□

ALPHA BLINDS DIST
JAMES N SHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

660.00

Minimum Payment Due:

2,005.51

.............................................
··--·1·---···:
:
:
: :
:
:
: : ·
l l j ll i l i i
I

PLEASE'WRITEIN :
PAYM&"ITENCLOSIW:

. . . . . . . . 1,,, ........ .1 • • • • • • • '

............ '1. • • • • • ,1 _______ \. · · · · · -

-------

MAKE PA YMENTTO:

5930

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PHILADELPHIA.PA 19101-8088

I111111.111 Ill 1111111 Ill 11111 LII II I I11L l11l1I11!1111 I, 111 Iii
54i5B4331441001B 2117951

✓

Dclacli'Top Portion and Enclose wilh Payment

ADVANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM BUSINESSCARD WITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

0.00
03/23/07
29
NOW DUE

Days In Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

21,258.32
0.00

78.00
578.19
735.00

0.00
21,179.51

{::;:::) New Balance

2,005.51 '
CASH BACK SUMMARY

Previous Balance
7.48

+/- Earned/Adjusted This Statement
0.00

03/15

- Forfeited This Statement

= Current Bnlnnce

0.00

7.48

TRANSACTIONS
Activity Since Last Statement

Reference Number

Post Date

03/15
03/23
03/23

BUSINESSCARD

Previous Balance
(+) Purchases & Cash Advances
(+) Fees
(+) Finance Charge
(-) Payments
(-) Credits

5475 8433 1441 0018
20,500.00
-679.00
20,500.00

Account Number
Total Credit Limit
Total Credit Available
Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Bil ling Cycle Closing Date

PLATINUM

BALANCE SUMMARY

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

Trans Date

0200551

85475842AOIOFAPWD

ELECTRONIC PYMT THANK YOUSLC

*FINANCE CHARGE*

OVERLIMIT FEE
LATE FEE
PURCHASES $411.97 CASH ADVANCE $166.22

03/23
03/23

Amount

UT

- 735.00
39.00
39.00

578.19

IMPORTANT NEWS
CARD USE MAY BE DECLINED IF AMOUNT DUE IS NOT
PAID IM MEDIATELY. QUESTIONS? PLEASE CALL US
AT 1-800-533-3686.
TOTAL •FINANCE CHARGE• BILLED IN 2006
$5919.81
TOTAL •FrNANCE CHARGE• PAID IN 2006 $5746.59

FINANCE CHARGES

PAYMENT SUMMARY

Finance Charges
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Rate
Rate
Periodic Rates
Fees
·.09356% 33.69%
33.69%
15,183.76
411.97
0.00
33.69%
6,126.40
166.22
0.00
.09356% 33.69%
Average

Purchases
Cash Advances

Nominal Annual

Daily

Annual

Payment Due
+ Amount Over Credit Limit

+ Past Due Amount
==

Minimum Payment Due

666.00

679.51
660.00
2,005.51

~

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:

l•l·Onllue:

By Mall:

/ :-·.·.-.·.-.·.\ www.advanla.~om
5962
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)(6D
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Advanta Bank Corp. P.O. Box 30715,

Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0715
SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
INFORMATION
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By Phoue:
l-800-705-7255

00068
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FCC24

PAYMENT INFORMATION

ADVIINTA

Account Nu111ber:
Payment Due Date:
New B::alnnce:
Minimum Payment Due:

C,·,ullt Cun/, fa,· S111<1ll Bmill.:si

Please check here if address, phone or
e-mail changes are indicated on reverse side

□

i I

5475 8433 1441 0018
05/18/07

20,495.22
652,00

l ! l ll

I;

PLEASE\VRITEIN i
j
PAYMENTENCLOSIW: l......t. .... J••••• .!,: ..... L ... L ... :,: .......... .:

ALPHA BLINDS DIST

MAKE PA YMENTTO:

6290

JAMES NSHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PH 11.ADELPHIA,PA 19101-8088

I11111 l1l11,11ll ll,11 ,11111111, 1111, l11li 111I, 1111, I11I, 111l,I
5475843314410018 2049522 0065200

V

~~~~~~~

ADVANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUMBUSINESSCARD WITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

BUSfNESSCARD

BALANCE SUMI\1ARY

5475 8433 1441 0018
20,500.00
4.00
20,500.00
4.00
04/23/07
31
05/18/07

A<;:count Number
Total Credit Limit
Total Credit Available
Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days [n Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

PLATINUM

Previous Balance
(+) Purchases & Cash Advances
(+) Fees
(+) Finance Charge
(·) Payments
{-) Credits
.(=) New Balance

21,179.51
0.00
39.00
602.71
1,326.00
0.00
. 20,495.22

652.00

CASH BACK SUMMARY

+/- Earned/Adjusted This Statement

Previous Balance
7.48

- Forfeited This Statement
0.00

0.00

= Current Balance
7.48

TRANSACTIONS
Post Date

Trans Date

04/07
04/23

04/07
04/23

Reference Number
854758432010JA195

"'FINANCE CHARGE*

Activity Since Last Statement
ELECTRONIC PYMT THANK YOUS LC
UT
OVERLIMIT FEE
PURCHASES $425.70 CASH ADVANCE $177.01

FINANCE CHARGES
Finance Charges
Average Nominal Annual Daily
Annual
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Periodic Rates
Fees
Rate
Rate
33.74%
425.70
0.00
14,653.93
.09371% 33.74%
6,093.35
177.01
0.00
33.74%
.09371% 33.74%

Purchases
Cnsh Advances

Amount
- 1,326.00
39.00
602.71
PAYMENT SUMMARY
Payment Due
652.00
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
0.00
+ Past Due Amount
0.00
=Minimum Payment Due
652.00

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
USE YOUR ADVANTA CARD AND SA VE UP TO $255 ON WEBSITE DESIGN
SERVICES FROM WEB.COM. ACT TODAY AND INSTANTLY SA VE 15% ON
ANY OF WEB.COM'S BUILT-TO-ORDER OR BUSINESS SOLUTIONS WEBSITE
PACKAGES FEATURING UP TO SISO IN FREE GOOGLE AND YAHOO SEARCH
CREDITS, AND OUR FREE AWARD-WINNING SITEBUILDER TOOL. VISIT
WWW.WEB.COM/ADVANTA OR CALL 1-800·935-6522 FOR DETAILS TODAY.

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT-US: ·

l•I
:::::.::.\ www.advanta.com

By Mall:

Online!

1

5962

0D0J

X6D

7

Advanta Bank Corp. P.O. Box 30715,

. Salt Lake City, UT 84130-07 l 5
Digitized by the
Howard
Hunter
Law
Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
NOTICE:
SEE W.
REVERSE
SIDE
FOR
IMPORTANT
INFORMATION
Machine-generated
OCR, may
PeQe 1 o~ l
8070contain
3300 errors.
?902 OlAA5962
6290
16
070423

By Phone:
1-800-705-7255

00069

~

~-

ADVANTA

Please check here if address, phone or
e•mail changes are indic:ited on reverse side

□

PLEASE WRITE IN

I

:i: ..... .L ... J... ... :,: ........... :

,~

l

I111ll l1l11 II ,II ll1111111111111 ll111I1111111111. ,L 1111, 11111 I

!

t
j

I

2115730 0198130

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

PLATINUM
8USINESSCARD

BALANCE SUMMARY

Previous Balance
(+) Purchases & Cash Advances

20,495.22
0.00
78.00
584.08

(+) Fees
(+) Finance Charge
(·) Payments
(-) Credits
(=) New Balance

0.00
0.00

21,157.30

1,981.30
CASH BACK SUMMARY
+/-Earned/Adjusted This Statement
0.00

= Current Balance

- Forfeited This Statement
0.00

· 7.48

GET 250 FREE BYS/NESS CARDS••• AND.SAVE 20% ON ADDITIONAL PRINTING
• Get 250 Business Cards FREE
• SAVE 20% on every order of additional customized
business cards, letterhead, and marketing materials
for your business
• EXCEPTIONAL OFFERS for Advanta Cardmembers

·1)oo)~ VistaPrint
~

BEST PRINTING. BEST PRICE.

For FREE business cards and more, visit www.vislaprint.com/advanlaspecial
The bellelils and lcalurcs ~n are cUcrcd by 011e or mote lhlrd•parly providers nol allllialed wilh Advanla and may be changed or 11.1thdra·M1 al any lime willloul notice. Advanta makes !his oHer awilable 10 Us
Dusiness Cudmemoers but assumes no respOl\'iillilily !Of lhc a\-ailabllity, quanm,~ quaUly, ap(lfortrialencss, US!. pe1lo1111ance or any o!her aspect ol lhe beneflls and lealures sho\\11.

Post Date

Trans Date

Reference Number

TRANSACTIONS
Activity Since Last Statement
OVERLIMIT FEE

05/23
05/23

05/23
05/23

LATE FEE
*FINANCE CHARGE*

PURCHASES $409.97 CASH ADVANCE$ I74.11

Amount
39.00

39.00
584.08

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:

l•I

By Mall: Advanta Bank Corp. P.O. Box 30715,

Online:

I::.·:.-.-.·.\ www.advanta.com
5962

0001

X6D

7

I
I

ADVANTA PLATL1'lUM BUSINESSCARD WITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

30
NOWDUE

!

i

1

~~~~~~~

S475 8433 1441 0018
20,500.00
- 657.00
20,500.00
0.00
05/23/07

I

i

[~

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PHILADELPHIA,PA 19101~8088

547584331441 □□ 18

Previous Balance
7.48

!

MAKE PAYMENT TO:

21179

~

21,157.30
652.00
1,981.30

i i i ii l i i i

PAYMENT ENCLOSED: : ..... .L. ... J.. ....

ALPHA BLINDS DIST
JAMES NSHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

Account Number
Totql Credit Limit
Total Credit Available
Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days In Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

54758433 1441 00!8
NOW DUE

Account Number:
Payment Due Date:
New Balance:
Past Due Amount:
Minimum Payment Due:

Q•,:tllt C:,mls Jo,: S,mdl Dusi,u:s1

ADVANTA

FCC25

PAYMENT INFORJ\,IATION

Salt Lake City, UT 84130•0715
Digitized byNOTICE:
the Howard
W. Hunter
Law
Library, J.
Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
IMPORTANT
INFORMATION
Machine-generated
OCR,8070
may 3300
containP902
errors.
X Paqa l o.f 2
16 070523
01AA596Z
21179

By Phone:
1-800-705-7255

00070

FCC26

✓

ADVANTA

Crr,lil C,u,l1/orS111ul1 Busi11eu

IMPORTANT NEWS
CARD USE MAY BE DECLINED IF AMOUNT DUE !SNOT
PAID IMMEDIATELY. QUESTIONS? PLEASE CALL US
AT 1-800-533-3686.

FINANCE CHARGES

Annual
Average Nominal Annual Daily
Finance Charges
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Rate
Periodic Rates
Fees
Rate
14,582.93
33.74%
409.97
0.00
.09371% 33.74%
6,193.22
33.74%
174.11
0.00
.09371% 33.74%

Purchases
Cash Advances

5962

0001

X6D

7

16

PA YM!l:NT SUl\fMARY

Payment Due
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
+ Past Due Amount
= Minimum Payment Due

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
21179
3300 P902
X Paao 2 o-f 2
Machine-generated
OCR, 8070
may contain
errors.OlAA5962
070523

672.00
657.30
652.00
1,981.30

00071

~

'if

PAYMENT INF0Riv1ATION

ADVANTA

Account Number:
Payment Due Date:
New Balance:

c.-~,lir C,mlJforSmult Busfocs,

Plense check here if address, phone or
c-mo.il chnnges arc indicated on reverse side

5475 8433 1441 0018
NOW DUE
21,184.30
672.00
2,129.30

Past Due Amount:

D

Minimum Payment Dne:

ALPHA BLINDS DIST
JAMES N SHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

FCC27

GiJ

MAKE PA YMENTTO:

11796

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PHILADELPHIA.PA 19101-8088

I111II 1,111,111111111111111111, 111111,.111111, 1.. 1, 1111, 1.. 1, I
54?5843314410 □ 18

2118430 0212930
~

'if

~~~~~~~

ADVANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM BUSINESSCARD WITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

BUSINESSCARD

BALANCE SUMMARY

5475 8433 1441 0018

Account Number
Total Credit Limit
Total Credit Available
Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days In Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

PLATINUM

20,500.00
-684.00

Previous Balance
(+) Purchases & Cash Advances
(+) Fees
(+) Finance Charge
(-) Payments
(-) Credits
(===) New Balance

21,157.30
0.00
78.00
601.00
652.00
0.00

20,500.00
0.00
06/22/07
30
NOW DUE
2,129.30
CASH BACK SUlvtMARY

Previous Balance

+/- Earned/Adjusted This Statement

7.48

0.00

- Forfeited ~~~s Statement

21,184.30

·

I

"" Current Balance
7.48

GET 250 FREE BIJSINESS CARDS... AND SAVE 20% ON ADDITIONAL PRIN'f/NG
• Get 250 Business Cards FREE
• SAVE 20%. on every order of additional customized
business cards, letterhead, and marketing materials
for your business

·1)0())~ VistaPrint
~

BEST PRINTING. BEST PRICE.

• EXCEPTIONAL OFFERS for Advanta Cardmembers

For FREE business cards and more, visitwww.vistaprinl.com/advantaspecial
Thi benefits and leallll~ shown are olrered by one or more U1ird-p2rty providers not amliated wilh All\-ai1ta and may Ile clianged or \\illuka·Nll aI any lime wilhoot notice. Advanra makes !his oiler ava!lable to ils
Business Cordmemlltrs bul assumes no responsibilill• for the a\-allabilily, quanlil\', qualily, approp1ialeoess, use, perlorm211ce 0< any O!her aspect or U1e bencflls and lealures sl1GV111.

05/31
05/31
06/22
06/22

Reference Number

Post Date

Trans Date

'

05/31
05/31
06/22
06/22

85475844P0 I0RGHJ4
F8374004P0OOPT53I
*FINANCE CHARGE*

TRANSACTIONS
Activity Since Last Statement
ELECTRONIC PYMT THANK YOUSLC
UT
PHONE PYMT SVC FEE-COL SALT LAKE CTY UT
OVERLIM[T FEE
LATE FEE
PURCHASES $417 .58 CASH ADVANCES 171.42

Amount

- 652.00
12.00
39.00
39.00
589.00

~

FOR.CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:

!Bl
Ouline:
:.·:::::.\ www.advanta.com

By Mall: Advanta Bank Corp. P.O. Box 30715,

1

5962

0001

X6D

7

Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0715
NOTICE:
SEE REVERSE
SIDE Law
FOR IMPORTANT
Digitized by the
Howard
W. Hunter
Library, J.INFORMATION
Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, 8070
may contain
errors.OlAA5962
16
070622
X Paae l o-f 2
3300 P902
11796

By PlLOne:
1-800-705-7255

00072

~

FCC28

✓

ADV/INTA

Cn:dlr C,mb for S111c1II Bmini:u

IMPORTANT NEWS
CARD USE MAY BE DECLINED IF AMOUNT DUE IS NOT
PAID IMMEDIATELY. QUESTIONS? PLEASE CALL US
AT 1-800-533-3686.

FINANCE CHARGES
Average Nominal Annual Daily
Annual
Finance Charges
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Rate
Rate
Periodic Rates
Fees
14,853.81
33.74%
.09371% 34.70%
417.58
0.00

Purchases
Cash Advances

6,097.73

33.74%

.09371%

33.74%

171.42

PA Y1\i1ENT SUMMARY
Payment Due
773.00
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
684.30
+ Past Due Amount
672.00
= Minimum Payment Due
2,129.30

0.00

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
IMPORTANT NEWS: EFFECTIVE JUNE I, 2007 THE BENEFITS PROVIDED
TO YOU AS A MASTERCARD CUSTOMER HAVE CHANGED SLIGHTLY.
NONE 0F YOUR EXISTfNG BENEFITS HAVE BEEN REMOVED. HOWEVER,
SOME TERMS & CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN UPDATED FOR CLARITY.
TO SEE A DETAILED OUTLINE OF YOUR NEW MASTERCARD BENEFITS,
PLEASE VISIT WWW.ADVANTA.COM/MC
0

5962

0001

X6D

7

J. 6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR,8070
may contain
errors.01AAS962
3300 P902
11796
X Paao 2 o-f 2
070622

00073

~

FCC29

PAYMENT INFOfu'VlATION

ADVANTA

Please check here if:lddress, phone or
e-mail changes ore indicated on reverse side

5475 3433 1441 0018
NOW DUE
21,231.23

Account Number:
Payment Due Date:
New Balance:
Pnst Due Amount:
Minimum Payment Due:

Cre,litC,mlsfo,·Sm,i/l D111iu.:ss

D

773.00
2,317.23

.....................
,: .......................
····· 1·······:
:
:
:
:
:
: :

PLEASEWRITEIN :
PAYMENI'ENCLOSED: !

. i l ! l·······'·····"'····-··
l l ! l.............. .l
·······"·····"·······'
\

MAKE PAYMENT TO:

6628

ALPHA BLINDS DIST
JAMES N SHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PHILADELPHIA,PA 19101-8088

I111lll1l,1,111111111111ll l11l1ll1111111, I.. Ll,11, 1.. 1, l11l1 I

54,5B43314410018 2123123 0231723

~

Dclnch Top Portion ~nd Enclose wilh Payment

ADVANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM BUSINESSCARD WITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

T1>tal Credit Available
Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days rn Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

8USINESSCARD

BALANCE SUMMARY

5475 8433 1441 0018
20,500.00
-731-.00
20,500.00
0.00
07/24/07
32
NOW DUE

Account Number
Total Credit Limit

PLATINUM

Previous Balance
(+) Purchases & Cash Advances
(+) Fees
(+) Finance Charge
(·) Payments
(·) Credits
(=) F;ew Balance

21,184.30
0.00
78.00
640.93
672.00
0.00
21,231.23

2,317.23

CASH BACK SUMMARY
Previous Balance
7.48

Trans Date

Post Date

06/30
06/30
07/24
07/24

06/30
06/30

+I- Earned/Adjusted This Statement

- Forfeited Tllls Statement

= Current Balance

0.00

0.00

7.48

TRANSACTIONS
Activity Since Last Statement

Reference Number
85475845MOIOW4KL6
F8374005MOOOPT630

07/24

07/24

*FINANCE CHARGE*

Amount
-672.00
12.00

ELECTRONIC PYMT THANK YOUSLC ' UT
PHONE PYMT SVC FEE-COL SALT LAKE CTY UT
OVERLIMlT FEE
LATE FEE
PURCHASES $447.27 CASH ADVANCE $181.66

39.00

39.00
628.93

IMPORTANT NEWS
CARD USE MAY BE DECLINED JF AMOUNT DUE IS NOT
PAlO IMMEDIATELY. QUESTIONS? PLEASE CALL US
AT 1-800-533-3686.

FINANCE CHARGES

Average Nominal Annual Daily
Annual
Finance Charges
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Periodic Rates
Fees
Rate
Rate
33.74%
14,915.48
.09371% 36.95%
447.27
0.00
33.74%
lSJ.66
0.00
.09371% 33.74% .
6,057.94

Purchases
Cash Advances

PAYMENT SUMMARY

Payment Due
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
+ Past Due Amount
= Minimum Payment Due

813.00
731.23

773.00
2,317.23

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FREE 250 FULL-COLOR BUSINESS CARDS FROM VISTAPRINT. YOU
CAN ALSO SAVE 20% ON FULL COLOR PRINTING AND DES£GN SERVICES
WHEN YOU USE YOUR ADVANTA CARD. PROMOTE YOUR BUSINESS AND
CUT BUSINESS PRINTING COSTS AT WWW.VISTAPRINT.COM/BUSJNES~

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:·

l•I
Online:
:::::;:.\ www.advanta.com

By Mall: Advanta Bank Corp. P.O. Box 30715,

1

5962

0003

)(60

7

Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0715
.
Digitized byNOTICE:
the Howard
W. Hunter
Law
Library, J.
Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
IMPORTANT
INFORMATION
Machine-generated
OCR,8070
may 3300
contain
errors.
X Paae l of l
P902
OlAA5962
6628
16
070724

By Phone:
1-800-705-1255

00074

~

FCC30

PAYMENT INfoORMATION

ADVANTA

Account Number:
Payment Due Dnte:
New Bnlnnce:
Past Due Amount:
Minimum Payment Due:

Cr,ulir C<Jn/s Jo,· Suld/t 1Jmi11cJJ

Please check here if acdress, phone or
e•mail changes are indicated on reverse side

□

PLEASE WRITElN l
PAYMEi.'lTENCLOSED: -l

!

i

:

i

5475 843) 1441 0018
NOW DUE
21,914.28
1,586.00
3,793.28

11

i

i

l :

l

l

l

l

.........., ........ J•••••• I' ♦••••••~••••• ... • • • • • •

.... 1······:1
'I,,

MAKE PA YMENTTO:

918D

ALPHA BLINDS DIST
JAMES N SHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

o

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PHILADELPHIA.PA 19101-8088

I111111,111 I 111111111 Ill 1111, I, 11111 I11li 11111 l1111 III I, 111 I, I
54,5B4331441 □□ 18

~

2191428 0379328

~-~~~~~

AD VANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM BUSINESSCARDWITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

@

@

5475 8433 1441 0018

• Previous Balance
7.48

+/-Earned/Adjusted This Statement

Previous Balance

21,231.23 .
0.00

(+) Purchases & Cash Advances
(+) Fees
(+) Finance Charge

20,500.00
-1,414.00

20,500.00
0.00

78.00
605.05
0.00
0.00
21,914.28

(-) Payments
(-) Credits
(=) New Balance

08/23/07
30

NOWDUE
3,793.28
CASH BACK SUMMARY

o.oo

- Forfeited This Statement

o.oo

Reference Number

TRANSACTIONS
Activity Since Last Statement

+FINANCE CHARGE"'

OVERLIMIT FEE
LATE FEE
PURCHASES $430.81 CASH ADVANCE $174.24

Post Date
08/23
08/23

08/23
08/23

BUSINESS CARD

BALANCE SUMMARY

Account Number
Total Credit Limit
Total Credit Available
Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days [n Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

Trans Date

PLATINUM

= Current Balance
7.48
Amount

39.00
39.00
605.05

IMPORTANT NEWS
YOUR ACCOUNT JS TWO MONTHS PAST DUE. DO NOT
USE YOUR CARD. QUESTIONS? PLEASE CALL US AT
1-800-533-3686.

FINANCE CHARGES

@

Average Nominal Annual Daily
Annual
Finance Charges
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Rate
Rate
Periodic Rates
Fees
33.74%
430.81
0.00
15,324.31
.09371% 33.74%
174.24
0.00
33.74%
6,197.93
.09371% 33.74%

Purchases
Cash Advances

PAYMENT SUMMARY
Payment Due.
793.00
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
1,414.28
+ Past Due Amount
1,586.00
= Minimum Payment Due
3,793.28

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FREE 250 FULL-COLOR BUSINESS CARDS FROM VISTAPRINT. YOU
CAN ALSO SA VE 20% ON FULL COLOR PRINTING AND DESIGN SERVICES
WHEN YOU USE YOUR" ADV ANTA CARD. PROMOTE YOUR BUSINESS AND
CUT BUSINESS PRINTING COSTS AT WWW.VISTAPRINT.COM/BUSINESS

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:.

1a1
011Une:
:.-~-:.-:~·-\ www.advanta.com

By-Mall: Advanta Bank Corp. P.O. Box 30715,
Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0715

1

5962

NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION

DDDl

)(60

7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
)( Pacie l o'f 1
D70823
8070 3300 P902 01AA596Z
9180
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

By PlLone:
1-800-705-7255

00075

~

FCC31

PAYMENT INFORMATION

ADV/INTA

Account Numbcc
Pa)•ment Due Date:
New Balance:
Past Due Amount:
Minimum Payment Due:

C,·.,,li1 C,1r,lsfol'S11ulll .ll1ui1u:u

Please check here if address, phone or
e-m.1il changes nre indicated on reverse side

□

ALPHA BLINDS DIST
JAMES N SHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

PLEASE \\'llITE IN
PAYMENT ENCLOSED:

5475 8433 1441 00 I 8
NOW DUE
22,712.66
2,379.00
5 1503-.66

L. . L. . L...l, L. .L. .L:J ~ L. l ...J

MAKE PA YfvlENT TO:

2823

ADVANTA BANK COR?
PO BOX 8088
PHILADELPHIA.PA 19101-8088

l,1,lll1l1,1,,llll,,,11,lll11l,ll1,,l,,l,l,,l,l1,l,l,,l,l,,l,I
547584331441001B 22712bh 05503bb

~

~~~~~~~~

ADV.ANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM BUSINESSCARD 'WITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

21,914.28
0.00
78.00

(+) Fees
(+) Finance Charge
(-) Payments
(-) Credits

720.38

0.00
0.00
22,712.66

(=) New Balance

33

Previous B11lnnce

+/- Earned/Adjusted This Statement
0.00

7.48

- Forfeited This Statement

""Current Balance

7.48

0.00

Reference Number

TRANSACTIONS
Activity Since Last Statement

*FINANCE CHARGE*

OVERLIM!T FEE
LATE FEE
PURCHASES $513.66 CASH ADVANCE $206.72

Post Date
09/25
09/25

09/25
09/25

Previous Balance
(+) Purchases & Cash Advances

NOW DUE
5,503.66
CASH BACK SUMMARY

Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

Trans Date

BUSINESSCARD

BALANCE SUMMARY

5475 8433 1441 0018
20,500.00
0.00
20,500.00
0.00
09/25/07

Account Number
Total Credit Limit
Total Credit Available
Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days In Billing Cycle

PLATINUM

Amount

39.00
39.00
720.38

IMPORTANT NEWS
YOUR ACCOUNT IS CURRENTLY CLOSED

YOUR CHARGE PRlVILEGES ARE TERMINATED! AVOID
FURTHER DAMAGE TO YOUR CREDIT RATING. PLEASE
CALL US AT 1-866-271-7559.

FINANCE CHARGES

PAYMENT SUMMARY

Finance Charges
Average Nominal Annual Daily
Annual
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Rate
Rate
Periodic Rates
Fees
513.66
0.00
35.31%
.09806% 35.31%
15,873.57
35.31%
206.72
0.00
.09806% 35.31%
6,388.03

Purchases

Cash Advances

Payment Due
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
+ Past Due Amount
=Minimum Payment Due

912.00
2,212.66
2,379.00
5,503.66

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:·

IMI

By Mall:

Online:

fI!If!If1 www .advanta.com
5962

0016

X6D

7

Advanta Bank Corp. P.O. Box 30715,

By Pl1oue:

Salt Lake City, UT 84130-0715

1-800-705-725 5

SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
IMPORTANT
Digitized byNOTICE:
the Howard
W. Hunter
Law
Library,INFORMATION
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
EXMachine-generated
PaQe l ~i l
8070
P902
01AAS962
2823
16 070925
OCR,
may3300
contain
errors.

00076

~

✓

FCC32

PAYMENT INFORMATION

ADVANTA

Account Number:
Payment Due Dntc:
New Balance:
P(lst Due Amount:
Minimum Payment Due: .

Cr.,,lit l',m1Jfo,·S11111ll B11si11,:ss

Please check here if address, phone or
e-mail changes are indicn1cd on reverse side

□

PLEASE\VRJTEIN

PAYMENTENCLOSED:
ALPHA BLINDS DIST
JAMES N SHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095•6028

5475 8433 1441 0018
NOW DUE

23,448.33
3,291.00

7,209.33°

i ! ! ii i ! ; ! I i
L. ...L .... L. ... l,L. ....t..... L ... 1, L......... .1

MAKE PA YMENTTO:

6897

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PHILADELPHIA.PA 19101 ·8088

I111111,111111ll ll,11111ll l11l1 ll111 lul,11111 l11l1 l,il, lrrlil
547SB433144l □ Dl8

✓

2344833 0720933

Dc1ach Top Ponion ond Enclose with Payment

AD VANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM BUSINESSCARD WITH CASH BACI( STATEMENT

5475 8433 1441 0018

Total Credit Limit
Total Credit Available

20,soo.oo

Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days In Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date

20,500.00
0.00
10/24/07

0.00

29

Previous Balance

+/-Earned/Adjusted This Statement

0.00

0.00

22,712.66
0.00
78.00
657.67
0.00
0.00
23,448.33

(+) Finance Charge
(·) Payments
(·) Credits
(=) New Balance

- Forfeited This Statement
0.00

Reference Number

TRANSACTIONS
Activity Since Last Statement

*FfNANCE CHARGE*

OVERLIMIT FEE
LATE FEE
PURCHASES $469.60 CASH ADVANCE $188.07

Post Date
10/24
10/24

10/24
10/24

Previous Balance
(+) Purchases & Cash Advances
(+) Fees

NOW DUE
7,209.33
CASH BACK SUMMARY

Minimum Payment Due

Trans Date

BUSINESS CARD

BALANCE SUMMARY

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

Account Number

PLATINUM

= Current Dnl:mce

o.oo

Amount
39.00
39.00
657.67

IMPORTANT NEWS
YOUR ACCOUNT IS CURRENTLY CLOSED
YOUR CHARGE PRIVILEGES ARE TERMINATED! AVOID
FURTHER DAMAGE TO YOUR CREDIT RATINO. PLEASE
CALL US AT 1·866-823-1742.

FINANCE CHARGES
Finance Charges
Nominal Annual Daily
Annual
Average
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Rate
Rate
Periodic Rates
Fees
35.46%
.09848% 35.46%
469.60
0.00
16,443.15
0.00
188.07
6,585.43
35.46%
.09848% 35.46%

@
Purchases
Cash Advances

PAYMENT SUMMARY

Payment Due
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
+ Past Due Amount
= Minimum Payment Due

·

970.00
2,948.33
3,291.00
7,209.33

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:

\Ml
Online:
:.·.·:.·.-.·.\ www.advanta.com

By Mall: Advanta Bank Corp. P.O. Box 30715,

1
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By Phone:
1·800-705•7255

00077

✓

FCC33

PAYMENT INFORMATION

ADVANTA

Account Number:
Payment Due Date:
New Balance:
Past Due Amount:

Cr.:,lir C"1·1l~forS111<1ll 1Jmiuess

Please check here if address, phone or
e-mail changes arc indicnlcd on reverse side

Minimum Payment Due:

□

54758433 14410018
NOW DUE
24,229.06
4,261.00
9,013.06

PLEASE WRITE IN
PAYMENT ENCLOSED:
MAKE PAYMENT TO:

2S62

ALPHA BLINDS DIST
JAMES N SHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PHILADELPHIA,PA 19101-8088

·l111lll1l1111,llll11111,lll,1l,ll,,,l,,l,l,1l,l,,l,l11l,l,,l,I
5475B4331441 □□ 1B

✓

2422906 090130b

~~~~~~~

AD VANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM BUSINESSCARD WITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

54"75 8433 1441 0018
Previous Balance
20,500.00
(+) Purchases & Cnsh Advances
(+) Fees
0.00
(+) Finance Charge
20,500.00
(-) Payments
0.00
l l/23/07
(-) Credits
(:::=) New Balance
30
NOW DUE
9,013.06
CASH BACK SUMMARY

Account Number
Total Ci:-edit Limit
Total Credit Available
Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days In Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

+/· Earned/Adjusted This Statement

Previous Balance
0.00

0.00

Post Date

11m

11/23
11/23

11/23

BUSINESSCARD

BALANCE SUMMARY

ACCOUNT SUMMARY

Trans Date

PLATINUM

- Forfeited This Statement
0.00

Reference Number

TRAN SA CTI ONS
Activity Sin~e Last Statement

*FINANCE CHARGE*

OVERLIMIT FEE
LATE FEE
PURCHASES $502.44 CASH ADVANCE $200.29

23.448.33
0.00
78.00
702.73
0.00
0.00
24,229.06

.,. Current Balance
0.00
Amount
39.00
39.00
702.73

IMPORTANT NEWS

~

YOUR ACCOUNT JS CURRENTLY CLOSED
YOUR CHARGE PRIVILEGES ARE TERMINATED! AVOID
FURTHER DAMAGE TO YOUR CREOJT RATING. PLEASE
CALL US AT J-866-271-7560.

FJNANCE CHARGES
Finance Charges
Average Nominal Annual Daily
Annual
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Rate
Rate
Periodic Rates
Fees
502.44
0.00
35.46%
.09848% 35.46%
17,006.78
200,29
o.oo
35.46%
.09848% 35/16%
6,779.47

Purchases
Cash Advances

PAYMENT SUMMARY

Payment Due
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
+ Past Due Amount
= Minimum Payment Due

1,023.00
3,729.06
4,261.00
9,013.06

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:

I

di

~
5962

Online:

www.advanla.com

OOOZ

X6D
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PA YM!l:NT INft'ORMATION

ADVANTA

Accotmt Number:
Pnyment Due Date:
New Balance:

Cr~tlit C,mlsfo,·Sm,ll11Jmiu"u

5475 8433 1441 0018
NOW DUE
25,057.77

Past Due Amount:
Please check here if address, phone or
e-m~il changes are indicated on rever,e side

□

ALPHA BLINDS DIST
JAMES N SHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

5,284.00

Minimum Payment Due:

10,921.77

PLEASE WRITE IN
PAYMENT ENCLOSl:m:
MAKE PA YMENTTO:

2166

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PHILADELPHIA.PA 19101-8088

I,1111 l,l,1 ,11II ll,11 .. ,II l11l,ll111I1111 l11L I.. L1.. 1, 1111, I
5475843314410018 2SD5?77 1D92177

V

~~~~~~~

AD VANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM BUSINESSCARD WITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

ACCOUNT SUMMARY
Total Credit Limit
Total Credit AvallabJe

Previous Balance
(+) Purchases & Cash Advances
{+) Fees
(+) Finance Charge
(-) Payments
(·) Credits
(=) New Balance

201500.00
0.00
20,500.00

Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days In Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

0.00
12/24/07

+/-Earned/Adjusted This Statement

0.00

Post Date

12/24
12/24

12/24
12/24

24,229.06

0.00
78.00
750.71
0.00
0.00
25,057.77

31
NOW DUE
10,921.77
CASH BACK SUMMARY

Previous Balance
0.00

Trans Date

8US£NESSCARD

BALANCE SUMMARY
5475 8433 1441 0018

Account Number

PLATINUM

- Forfeited This Statement
0.00

Reference Number

TRANSACTIONS
Activity Since Last Statement

*FINANCE CHARGE*

OVERLIMIT FEE
LATE FEE
PURCHASES $537.43 CASH ADVANCE $213.28

= Current Balance
0.00
Amount
39.00
39.00
750.71

IMPORTANT NEWS
YOUR ACCOUNT IS CURRENTLY CLOSED
YOUR CHA ROE PRIVILEGES ARE TERM[NATED! A VOID
FURTHER DAMAGE TO YOUR CREDIT RATING. PLEASE
CALL US AT 1-866-271-7547.

TOTAL *FINANCE CHARGE• BILLED TN 2007

$7638.09

FINANCE CHARGES

Gi

PAYMENT SUMMARY

Finance Charges
Average
Nominal Annual Daily
Annual
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Periodic Rates
Fees
Rate
Rate
.09848% 35.46%
17,604.29
35.46%
537.43
0.00
.09848% 35:46%
213.28
0.00
6,986.10
35.46%

Purchases
Cash Advances

Payment Due
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
+ Past Due Amount
;::: Minimum Payment Due

1,080.00

4,557.77
5,284.00

l 0,921. 77

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US: .

1a1

By Mall:

Online:
/ .:-:.·.-.-:.-.\ www.advnnta.com
5962_
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By Phone:
1-800-705-7255
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~

FCC35

PAYMENT INFORMATION

ADVANTA

Account Number:

5475 8433 1441 0018
NOW DUE
25,901.76
6,364.00
12,868.76

Payment Due Date:

Cr,alil C,mlJ Jot S111111/ Bmim:ss

New Ilalnnce:

Please check here if address, phone or
e-mail changes are indicated on reverse side

Past Due Amount:
Minimum Payment Due: .

□

ALPHA BLINDS DIST

PLEASE \VRITE IN
PAYMENT ENCLOSED:

. .. .I. . .

L..J. . . L. . l~l . . ..t .....1. . .J,

1::

MAKE PAYMENTTO:

10200

JAMES NSHAW

16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088
PHILA.DELPHIA,PA 191 D1-8088

l,1,lll,l,,,,,llll,,,,,,lll,,l1ll,,,l,,l,l,,l1l1,l,l,,l,l,,l1I
5~758~33144)0018 2590176 128687b

~

~~~~~~~

AD VANTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM BUSINESSCARD WITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

ACCOUNT SUM.MARY
Account Number
Total Credit Limit

0.00

Total Credit Available

Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days In Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

Trans Date

Post Date

01/24

01/24
01/24

01/24

20,500.00
0.00
01/24/08

Previous Balance
(+) Purchases & Cash Advances
(+) Fees
(+) Finance Charge
(-) Payments
(-) Credits
(=) New Balance

25,057.77
0.00
78.00
765.99
0.00
0.00
25,901.76

31
NOW DUE
12,868.76
CASH BACK SUMMARY
+/. Earned/Adjusted This Statement
0.00

0.00

BUSINESSCARD

BALANCE SUMMARY
5475 8433 1441 0018
20,500.00

Previous Balance

PLATINUM

- Forfeited This Statement

o.oo

Reference Number

TRANSACTIONS
Activity Since Last Statement

*FINANCE CHARGE*

OVER.LIMIT FEE
LATE FEE
PURCHASES $549.05 CASH ADVANCE $216.94

= Current Balance
0.00

Amount
39.00
39.00

765.99

lMPORTANT NEWS
YOUR ACCOUNT IS CURRENTLY CLOSED
YOUR CHARGE PRIVILEGES ARE TERMINATED! A VOID
FURTHER DAMAGE TO YOUR CREDJT RATING. PLEASE
• CALL US AT 1-866-271-7529.

TOTAL *FINANCE CHARGE.* BILLED IN 2007
$7638.09
TOTAL *FfNANCE CHARGE* PAID IN 2007 $3477.84
FINANCE CHARGES

Average Nominal Annual Daily
Finance Charges
Annual
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic Percentage Due to Daily Transaction
Rate
Rate
Periodic Rates
Fees
34.99%
18,225.33
.09718% 34.99%
549.05
0.00
34.99%
.09718% 34.99%
7,201.IS
216.94
0.00

Purchases
Cash Advances

PAYMENT SUMMARY
Payment Due
+ Amount Over Credit Limit

+ Past Due Amount

= Minimum Payment Due

1,103.00
5,401.76
6,364.00
12,868.76

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:

IMI
.Online:
.:-:::.·.·:.\ www.advarita.c~m

1
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By Phone:
1-800-705-7255

00080

~

PAYMENT INFORlvtATION

ADVANTA

Account Number:
Payment Due Date:
New Bnlancc:
Minimum Payment Due:

C,·.,lit Cunbfo,·S111<lll B11si11•u

Please check here if address, phone or
e-mail changes are indicated on reverse side

□

FCC63

5475 8433 1441 0018
NOW DUE
0.00
0.00

PLEASE 'WRIT& IN
PAYMENT ENCLOSED:

ALPHA BLINDS DIST
JAMES N SHAW
16515 WHEATFIELD DR
HOUSTON TX 77095-6028

MAKE rAYMENTTO:

ADVANTA BANK CORP
PO BOX 8088

PHILADELPHIA.PA 19101-8088

ll111ll 1, 1lll 11, l,I 111 I, l11ll11ll11111I, II 1111 Ill ll1 l1I 1ll 1111

11111II1111111ll ll111111lll11l1ll111I II l1I II 1,1111,1 II 1.1111,1

5475843314410018 0000000
~

~~~~~·~

ADVIINTA

ADVANTA PLATINUM BUSINESSCARD WITH CASH BACK STATEMENT

ACCOUNT SUMMARY
Account Number
Total Credit Limit
Total Credit Available
Cash Advance Credit Limit
Cash Advance Credit Available
Billing Cycle Closing Date
Days In Billing Cycle
Payment Due Date
Minimum Payment Due

Trans Date

□□□□□□□

Previous Balance
(+) Purchases & Cash Advances
(+) Fees
(+) Finance Charge
(-) Payme11ts
(-) Credits

30

(=)

25,901.76
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
;is,90P6·
0.00

New Balance

NOW DUE
0.00

TRANSACTIONS
Activity Since Last Statement

Reference Number

F807000DF00999990
F807000DF00999990

01/31
01/31

BUSINESSCARD

BALANCE SUMMARY
5475 8433 1441 0018
20,500.00
0.00
20,500.00
0.00
01/31/08

Post Date

01/31
01/31

PLATINUM

Amount

CHARGE OFF ACCOUNT-PRINCIPALS
CHARGE OFF ACCOUNT *FINANCE CHARGES*

IMPORTANT NEWS
TOTAL •FINANCE CHARGE• BILLED IN 2007
$7638.09
TOTAL •FINANCE CHARGE• PAID £N 2007 $3477.84

FINANCE CHARGES

.

Average Nominal Annual Daily
Daily Balance Percentage Rate Periodic
Rate
0.00
34.99%
.09718%
0.00
34.99%
.09718%

Purchases
Cash Advances

PAYMENT SUMMARY

(Knnual;
(Per~e~tage

tlla'te:

{j~~99%·
{3~:9~~

Finance Charges
Due to Daily Transaction
Periodic Rates
Fees
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Payment Due
+ Amount Over Credit Limit
+ Past Due Amount
= Minimum Payment Due

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE, PLEASE CONTACT US:

\Nill
Online:
::.·::::.\ www.advanta.com

By

1

5962
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X6D

1
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MAY 2 9 2014
::SALi LAK~ C1.. :;~,FY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
By: _ _ _ _--4---:::-------l.\-C~f=
o~-=~ur~, (~;~;~,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION,
d.b.a. FEDERATED FINANCIAL
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiff,
Case No. 139910356
VS.

Hon. Denise P. Lindberg
JAMES N. SHAW, d.b.a. ALPHA BLINDS
DIST.,
Defendant.

Currently before the Court is Defendant James N. Shaw's combined motion for summary
judgment and an award of attorney fees. 1 In the motion, Shaw seeks summary judgment in his favor on
the ground that Plaintiff Federated Capital Corporation's (Federated) claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. Shaw also seeks an award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah's reciprocal attorney fees
statute. See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-826 (2013). The Court scheduled a telephonic hearing on the
matter on April 30, 2014. At that hearing, the parties agreed that oral argument was not necessary and
that it would be appropriate for the Court to render a decision based solely on the parties' briefs. Having
fully considered the materials submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS Shaw's motion.
BACKGROUND

Unless noted otherwise, the following facts are undisputed. Shaw opened a credit card account
with Advanta Bank (Advanta), which was governed by an Account Agreement (the Agreement). The
Agreement provides that Shaw was to make or send all payments to Advanta at a location selected by
Advanta in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. While the Agreement also provided that Advanta could be made
via other means, the Agreement further stated that any such payments would not be deemed effective
until those payments had been "received by [Advanta] at the [Philadelphia] address specified."
By March of 2007, Shaw defaulted on his repayment obligations under the Agreement. Advanta
subsequently assigned Shaw's account to Federated, which is a Michigan-based corporation. Federated
initiated this action to recover the amount owing on June 11, 2013. Shaw was served with a copy of the
1

Federated also brought a separate motion to compel arbitration of its claim against Shaw. The Court has addressed the
arbitration issue in a separate ruling denying the motion.
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Summons and Complaint seven days earlier, on June 4, 2013. Shaw now brings the instant motion,
seeking to dismiss all of Federated 's claims against him.
ANALYSIS

Shaw's primary argument is that Pennsylvania's four-year statute of limitations applies to
Federated's claims, and because Federated brought this action more than four years after the default
occurred, this action is time-barred. The Court agrees with Shaw.
The Agreement specifically provides that any legal action between the parties shall be litigated in
a Utah court and will be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. Based on that provision, Utah's laws
apply to this case-including Utah's Borrowing Statute (the Borrowing Statute). See Utah Code Ann. §
78B-2-103 (2013). The Borrowing Statute provides that "(a] cause of action which arises in another
jurisdiction, and which is not actionable in the other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time, may not
be pursued in this state, unless the cause of action is held by a citizen of this state who has held the cause
of action from the time it accrued." Id.
Here, it is undisputed that Federated is a Michigan-based corporation and as such, is not a
resident ofUtah. 2 The Agreement provides that cardmembers should make all payments to Advanta in
Pennsylvania or in another manner provided for by Advanta. However, any such payments would only
be considered "effective" upon Advanta's receipt of the payment at its Pennsylvania address.
Nevertheless, Federated argues that because Shaw was technically able to make his payments in
Utah, the Agreement was performed-and ultimately breached-in Utah. However, based on the plain
language of the Agreement, that argument fails. As noted above, even if a payment could be tendered at
another location, those payments were only deemed effective when Advanta received the payment at the
Pennsylvania address specified in the Agreement. In light of that clear provision, it is evident that
Shaw's ultimate obligation was required to be perfonned in Pennsylvania. It is well-established that
under Utah law, "a cause of action for a breach of contract generally arises where the contract is to be
performed." Financial Bancorp, Inv. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Therefore, when Shaw failed to make the required payments, the default occurred and Advanta's cause
of action arose in Pennsylvania in March of 2007.
Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations expired four years after Defendant defaulted
on the Agreement. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a) (2013). Neither Advanta nor Federated brought an action
under the Agreement within that timeframe. Consequently, Advanta's claim "is not actionable in the
other jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-103.
That conclusion notwithstanding, Federated argues that this action is not actionable in
Pennsylvania because the Agreement identifies Utah as the sole forum in which the parties may bring
2

In its opposition, Federated admits that it was incorporated in Michigan. Federated adds an allegation that it has a Salt Lake
City office. However, Federated does not point to any evidence in support of that claim. Moreover, neither party raises or
addresses the related questions of whether Advanta was a Utah resident and whether those rights ofresidency would pass to
Federated as assignee. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, I assume that Federated is a resident of Michigan.
2
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litigation. Therefore, Federated claims, the Borrowing Statute does not apply because the claim is also
not actionable in Pennsylvania due to the choice of forum clause. The Court rejects that argument.
The simple fact that Defendant would have an additional defense to an action in Pennsylvania
does not make the Borrowing Statute inapplicable. Taken to its logical end, Federated's claim would
make the Borrowing Statute inapplicable anytime a defendant could raise any viable defense in another
jurisdiction. Moreover, the clear intent of the Borrowing Statute is to prevent a party from forumshopping and choosing to bring an action in Utah where the same action would be time-barred in
another jurisdiction. For these reasons, the Court rejects Federated's argument that the choice of forum
clause makes the Borrowing Statute inapplicable.
Based on the foregoing, the Borrowing Statute would apply to this action. Thus, because
Federated failed to bring this action within four years of Defendant's default, this action is barred by the
statute of limitations.
With respect to the motion for attorney fees, it is undisputed that the Agreement contains an
attorney fees provision that would allow Advanta or Federated to recover its attorney fees against Shaw
if they were to prevail in litigation. Shaw has successfully defended against Federated's claim against
him. Therefore, under Utah's Reciprocal Attorney Fees Statute, Shaw is entitled to recover his
reasonable fees from Federated. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826.
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Shaw's combined motion for summary judgment and
attorney fees. Accordingly, the Court further directs counsel for Shaw to submit an affidavit showing the
reasonable attorney fees incurred by Shaw in defending against this action and a proposed order that
reflects the Court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment.
1'-

DATED this&-day of May, 2014

3
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION

I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 139910356 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: CHRISTOPHER CHILL 10 EXCHANGE PL STE 527 SALT LAKE CITY,
UT 84111
MAIL: LESTER A PERRY 4276 S HIGHLAND DR SALT LAKE CITY UT 84124
05/29/2014

/s/ KRISTIN FERGUSON

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 05/29/14 11:03:01

Page 1 ( last)
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1 he Order of Court 1s stated below:
/ .:: ~t,~iff'"~~, \
Dated: June 29, ::W 14
Isl Denise~P; Lj@~crg · J
12:46: 1-l PM
Districff.9urfft1dge/

·--.:./:j~~1·;-} ~; ,,•
~

Lester A. Perry (2571)
HOOLE & KING
Attorneys for Defendant
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (80 l) 272-7556
Facsimile: (80 I) 272-7557
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FED ERA TED CA PIT AL CORPORATION,
dba FEDERATED FINANCIAL
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,

Summary Judgment

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 139910356

v.

JAMES N. SHAW, d.b.a. ALPHA BLINDS
DIST.

Judge Denise P. Lindberg

Defendant.
The defendant moved the Court for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs
Complaint as being barred by the statute of limitations. The Court read and considered the
pleadings and exhibits filed by the parties. Based upon the undisputed facts and argument set
forth therein, the Court grants the following summary judgment.
The Complaint of the plaintiff is dismissed with prejudice and judgment is granted for the
~

defendant and against the plaintiff for the attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in this
lawsuit in the amount of$13,719.62, plus interest thereon at the judgment rate.
Dated this __ day of June, 2014.

June 29, 2014 12:46 PM
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By the Comt:

Denise P. Lind berg
District Court Judge
Certificate of Service

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was served on the
following this 16th day of June, 20 l 4 via electronic filing.
Christopher C. Hill
Federated Capital Corp.
10 Exchange Place, No. 527
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Isl Aubrev P. Broome

2

June 29, 2014 12:46 PM
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REGAN R. DUCKWORTH, ESQ.

FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION
Utah Bar Number 12500
IO Exchange PL, Ste. 527
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ph: (248) 737-1300
Fx: (248) 406-8053
rduckworth@fedcap.com
Attorney/or Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FEDERATED CAPITAL
CORPORATION d/b/a FEDERATED
FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND
MOTION FOR AN A \VARD OF
ATTORi~EY'S FEES

V.

CONOR LIBBY d/b/a CRITTERBOX,
Defendant(s).

Case No.: 129914062
Judge: Kate A. Toomey

COMES NOW Plaintiff FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION d/b/a FEDERATED
FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA ("Plaintiff'), by and through undersigned
counsel, and files its MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION ("Memo") TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT- STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND MOTION FOR AN AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ("Defendant's Motion"). A declaration of counsel in support of this
Memo ("Declaration") is filed concurrently herewith and is incorporated by reference herein.
Defendant CONOR LIBBY d/b/a CRITTERBOX ("Defendant" or collectively with
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Plaintiff as the "Parties") has moved for summary judgment in this matter arguing that this case
should be dismissed because Plaintiffs causes of action for breach of a certain agreement
between the Parties ('·Agreement," which was attached both Plaintiffs Complaint and to
Defendant's Motion as Exhibit '"D'.) were not brought within the period required by appropriate
statutes of limitations~ and that the Court should award Defendant attorney's fees and costs.
Despite the arguments made by Defendant, the Court should deny the relief sought because of
the reasons discussed in detail below.

I. RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

1.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant had a credit card account with Advanta.

See generally 11 & 2, Complaint.
Response: The document(s) referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves.
Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits
the same.

2.

The defendant alleges that the account was assigned to it by Advanta.

13, Complaint, as to fact of assignment, and Exhibit 2 of the Complaint, a

a.

Bill of Sale dated Ju(v 11, 2007 that is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", alleged by
the plaintiff to be the bill of sale that includes the defendant's account in the
transfer of the account to the plaintiff.
Response: The document(s) referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves.
Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits
the same.
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3.

The documents produced by the plaint(IJ slzoiv that the account i-ras assigned to

the plaintiff after the account was in default.
a.

Advanta monthly statement, Exhibit ''B ··, showing the account current

with the next payment due August 4, 2006;
b.

Advanta monthly statements, Exhibit "C ", showing that the August 4,

2006 payrnent ·was not made, thus constituting a default under the terms of the Account
Agreement. See ,I 10(a) of the Agreement 1-vhich is attached to the plaint([/ s complaint

and is attached hereto as Exhibit "D ";
c.

Advanta monthly statement, Exhibit "E '', showing payment on October 31,

2006 of $517.00, an amount insufficient to cure the default.
d.

Advanta monthly statements, Exhibit ''F", showing no further payments

on the account; and
e.

Advanta monthly statement that is Exhibit 5 to the plaintiffs Complaint,

attached hereto as E-chibit "G ", that shows no further charges or payments to the
account and a charge off of all amounts on the account on April 30, 2007.

Response: Plaintiff denies that the October 31, 2006 payment was insufficient to
cure the default pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. See Agreement at

~~

6 and 11

("[i]f you pay in installments, you must pay at least the minimum payments shown on
your periodic billing statement.). Additionally, document(s) referenced in this paragraph
speak for themselves. Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those
documents, Plaintiff admits the same.
3
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4.

The plaintiff is not a citi::en-of Utah, but is a lvfichigan corporation ivith its place

of business in Farmington Hills l\fichigan. See affidavit of Jennifer F. Ferris, Exhibit 4 to tlze
plaintiff's Complaint and attached hereto as Exhibit "H".
Response: Plaintiff states that it is legally licensed to do business in the state of
Utah. See Entity Details, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Additionally, the
document(s) referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves. Inasmuch as this
statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits the same.

5.

The Account Agreement attached to the plaintiff~ Complaint as Exhibit 1, and

attached hereto as Exhibit "D ", states that the defendant is to make payment on the account at
the address indicated on the Advanta monthly statements.
a.

See ,r6, "You agree to make all payments ... to us [Advanta} at the

location and in the manner specified on your periodic billing statement ... " See also,
towards the end 6, "Account payments are to be mailed to the address for payments
shown on your periodic billing statement."

Response: the document(s) referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves.

~

Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits
the same.

6.

Advanta selected Philadelphia, Pennsylvania as the place that payments were to

be sent on each and eve,y monthly account statement. See monthly statements identified above.
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Response: the document(s) referenced in this paragraph speak for themselves.

Inasmuch as this statement of fact does not contradict those documents, Plaintiff admits
the same.

7.

This case was filed on October 4, 2012 and service of the Summons and

Complaint was thereafter made on the defendant in January, 1013. Judicial notice.
Response: Admit.

II. ADDITIONAL FACTS
1.

Advanta was a Utah Company located in Salt Lake County Utah from 1989 to

November 3, 2010. See Exhibit 1; see also Declaration.
2.

Plaintiff is an assignee of Advanta and is duly authorized and has all rights in and

to Defendant's obligation to pay sums due on the Account and has all of the rights, powers and
authority to enforce the tenns and conditions that govern or have governed the Account. See Bill
of Sale, which was attached to Defs. Mot. as Exhibit A; see also Agreement at ,r 23 ("We may
sell or assign any or all of our rights and obligations in the Account, and/or this agreement
without notice.").
3.

An additional term of the Agreement is the choice of law and forum selection

clause requiring any party that files a lawsuit pertaining to the Agreement to sue only in Utah
applying Utah law:
31. CONTROLLING LAW AND JURISDICTION. This Agreement shall
be governed solely by and interpreted entirely in accordance with the laws
of the State of Utah, ... regardless of where you reside or where the
Business is located. We process the Account applica_tion, make the
decision to open the Account and advance credit for you from our Utah
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offices .... YOU CONSENT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS IN UTAH AND AGREE THAT
ANY LAWSUIT PERTAINING TO THE ACCOUNT MUST BE
BROUGHT ONLY IN SUCH COURTS IN UTAH, REGARDLESS OF
WHO FILES THE SUIT, AND MAY BE MAINTAINED ONLY IN
THOSE COURTS UNLESS AND UNTIL ANY PARTY ELECTS
ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IN
THIS AGREEMENT.

See Agreement at § 31.
4.

An additional term of the Agreement, on which Defendant's Motion relies,

discuss terms of payment:

6. PAYMENT: We may process your payment check by electronically
debiting your account at your bank for your check amount and
transmitting check information (such as check amount, routing number
and check number), or a digital image of the check, or some other
substitute instrument, rather than the actual check, to your bank, and your
bank's record of that payment may appear as an automatic debit, substitute
check or other electronic transaction rather than a negotiated paper check).
. . . . If you pay in installments, you must pay at least the minimum
payments shown on your periodic billing statement. .... Account payments
are to be mailed to the address for payment shown on your periodic billing
statement. Payment must be received by us at that address ort or before the
specified time on the Payment Due Date stated on your period,ic billing
statement, and must conform to any specific requirements for making
payment which appear with or in your billing statement. ....

Id. at§ 6.
5.

An additional term of the Agreement deals with Plaintiff's rights in the event of

default:
11. RIGHTS UPON AN EVENT OF DEFAULT: If any event of default
occurs, we may do any or all of the following, without advance notice to
you: (a) declare the outstanding balance owing on the Account to be
immediately due and payable; (b) allow you to repay the Account subject
to the terms and conditions of this Agreement; (c) refuse to pay any
6
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Convenience Checks or other withdrawals or charges; (d) immediately
terminate Account credit privileges; (e) suspend the availability of the
Account and /or any of our account support facilities (such as Website
access); (t) adjust your Account pricing and/or the formula we use to
calculate the minimum payment due on the Account, either as set out in
Paragraphs 6 and 8 or otherwise; (g) consider the Account no longer in
"good standing", for purposes of participating in Account programs and
features (such as Cash Back and other reward programs), eligibility for
introductory and/or promotional rates and/or offers, or otherwise; (h)
impose the Credit Limit hold as set out in Paragraph 6; (i) cancel your
Credit Protection and/or Credit Insurance; U) offset any outstanding
balance owing on the Account with any funds from any deposit or
investment account you have with us or our affiliates (subject to the terms
of any such account and to applicable law). . ... Upon our demand, you
will immediately pay the outstanding Account balance in full and return
all Cards and unused Convenience Checks.

Id. at§ I l.

III. ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Based on the following, Defendant has failed to show that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

1. THE UNDERLYING CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE IN UTAH, THUS THE
BORRO\-VING STATUTE IS INAPPLICABLE
Defendant, relying on Utah law, states that Utah's statutes of limitations apply to actions
brought in Utah. Financial Bancorn. Inc. v. Pingree and Dahle. Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 'if7 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1994). Furthermore, Defendant, by way of his motion, is not challenging the subject forum
selection clause. Thus, Plaintiff concurs with Defendant that the Utah statutes of limitations
7
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govern this lawsuit. However, where the parties disagree is in regard to the applicability of
Utah's "borrowing statute" and where perfonnance by Defendant actually occu1Ted.
The "borrowing statute" applies only to causes of action that arise in another state. Pan

Energy v. Martin, 813 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1991). Defendant relies on Brown v. Bach. 53 P.
991 (Utah 1898) for the proposition that a cause of action for breach of contract arises in the state
in which the parties determine that perfonnance was due. Although the issue before the Brown
court dealt with selection of venue in certain counties within the same state (Brown at 994;

holding that "the cause of action in [that] case arose in Salt Lake City and county where the note
was made payable, and that the suit was improperly brought in Tooele county."), Plaintiff agrees
with Defendant, for the sake of Defendant's Motion, that a cause of action for non-payment of a
note or breach of a contract may arise where the note was to be paid or the contract performed.

Lawson v. Tripp, 95 P. 520 (Utah 1908). "The place of payment in a promissory note, or in an
acceptance of a bill of exchange, is always matter of arrangement between the parties for their
mutual accommodation, and may be stipulated in any manner that may best suit their
convenience." Brown at 994.
Defendant argues that the Pa11ies only stipulated to performance of the subject contract in
a Pennsylvania, and thus, the cause of action for breach of contract arose there. Certainly, the
Agreement between the Parties provides that Defendant was to perform the contract by making
payment to Advanta. See Exhibit O to Oef's. Mot. at

~l

6. One way that Defendant could have

made payments was by mailing them to the address indicated on the Advanta monthly
statements. Id.
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However, the problem with Defendant's argument is that the Parties stipulated in
Agreement that it could be paid within more than one jurisdiction. Moreover, not only was
payment contemplated in a variety of manners, but Defendant in fact did not even perform in
Pennsylvania by making payments there, as evidenced by the statements attached to Defendant's
Motion.
Plaintiff, as assignee of Advanta, processed the Account application, made the decision to
open the Account and advanced credit to Defendant from its Utah offices. See Agreement at §

31. Regarding electronic payment, the Agreement states, in relevant part, the following:
[ w ]e may process your payment check by electronically debiting your

account at your bank for your check amount and transmitting check
information (such as check amount, routing number and check number), or
a digital image of the check, or some other substitute instmment, rather
than the actual check, to your bank, and your bank's record of that
payment may appear as an automatic debit, substitute check or other
electronic transaction rather than a negotiated paper check).

Id. at§ 6.
Based on the evidence before the Court, Defendant made payments pursuant to the terms
of the Agreement by telephone or other electronic means. See Def s. Mot. at Exhibit B and E.
These payments were presumably initiated in California and, as the documentary evidence
submitted by Defendant reflects, received in Utah. Id. Thus, Defendant's performance actually
occurred in Utah, and not Pennsylvania. Accordingly, the "borrowing statute" does not apply
because the cause of action arose in Utah.
More importantly, Defendant admits that he failed to pay as he agreed and now seeks
~

relief from this Court to not honor his previous agreement on an invalid procedural technicality.
9
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~

Furthermore, and as cited by Defendant, should the Court decide that the Parties did not stipulate

~

to performance in a ce11ain state, the cause of action clearly arises in the state in \Vhich the
contract was made, which by the te1ms of the Agreement is clearly Utah. Financial Bancorp,

Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 17.

2. THIS MATTER WAS FILED WITHI~ THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF
Lli\ 1IT ATION
1

Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are based upon a writing and therefore the governing
statute of limitations is six (6) years. The applicable statute is Utah Code Ann. § 788-2-309(2),
which states ''[a]n action may be brought within six years: ... (2) upon any contract, obligation
or liability founded upon an instmment in writing[.]" The six years statute of limitations does
not require that a writing be signed, but only that the liability be founded upon an instrument in
writing. The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2309(2) in Empire Land Title, Inc., v. Weyerhaeuser Mortgage, Co., 797 P.2d 467 (Utah 1990).

See also Recent Rulings, which are attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
Here, Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are based upon written terms and conditions;
the Advanta Business Card Agreement. The terms and conditions are a written memorialization
of the provisions governing the use of the business card. Thus, the terms and conditions are a
writing as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2) and the applicable statute of limitation is
6 years. The subject complaint was filed on October 4, 2012. See Court Docket. Defendant made
her last payment on the Account on October 31, 2006. See Def s. Mot. at Exhibit E. Thus, the
Complaint was filed within the applicable statute of limitation.
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3. THERE CLEARLY EXISTS A RATIONAL NEXUS TO UTAH

Utah law, as relied on by Defendant, is applicable in this case given that the Agreement
contains a forum selection and a choice of law provision indicating Utah law is applicable, and
the Agreement was made here. See Agreement at § 31. Moreover, fomm selection clauses are
"prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to
be ·unreasonable' under the circumstances." See j\,f/S Brernen v. Zapata qf(-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 10, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), citing National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. &ukhent,
375 U.S. 311, 315-16, 84 S.Ct. 411, II L.Ed.2d 354 (1964) (noting it was settled law that
·•parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court"). 1
Here, there is a rational nexus between: I) the forum consented to by the Parties; 2) both
Plaintiff, as assignee of Defendant (where located at all relevant times) and Defendant (the state
where he sent payments)~ and 3) the transactions that are the subject matter of the contract.
Jacobsen, 2005 UT 4, ,I 11. Regarding Pennsylvania, there is no rational nexus given that
Defendant did not perform there and the only fact relied on by Defendant that seems to connect
this case to Pennsylvania is a payment PO Box listed on the statements sent to Defendant.
More importantly in this case, there is no evidence to indicate that Plaintiff is not acting
in good faith by bringing this action in Utah. In fact, the reason why this matter was brought in
Utah was so that it could properly perform pursuant to the Agreement. But for the forum

1

Although the Bremen case involved an international forum selection clause, the Bremen standard also applies in
cases involving domestic fonnn selection clauses. See, e.g., Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc.,
74 l F.2d 273 (9th Cir.1984) (ovenuled on other grounds, Powerex Co,p. v. Relia11f Energy Svcs., 551 U.S. 224,
235-36, I 27 S.ct. 2411, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007)).
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selection cause. Plaintiff may have been better served by its complaint elsewhere. Accordingly,
the Court should not apply Pennsylvania law.
4. BECAUSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE, THE COURT
SHOULD NOT A WARD ATTORNEYS' FEES OR COSTS

Because the Court should deny Defendant's Motion, the Court should also not award
attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Utah's Reciprocal Attorney's Fee statute (the "Stahtte").
However, if the Com1 grants Defendant's Motion, the award of Attorneys' fees and cost is not
automatic or mandatory, but is discretionary.
The Statute provides that a court "may" award attorney fees and costs to prevailing party
in any action based upon a written contract if the contract allows at least one pa1iy to recover
attorney fees. Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041, 1046 (Utah 2007), rehearing denied; Giz_1sti v.
Sterling Wentworth Corp., 201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009). Whether attorney fees should be awarded

under the

Statute involves a policy-driven analysis

subject to

the district court's

~

discretion. Hooban v. Unicity Intern., Inc., 220 P.3d 485, 488 (Utah App. 2009), certiorari
granted 225 P.3d 880, affirmed 285 P.3d 766.

The Stah1te is applied on a case-by-case basis in order to detennine which party
"prevailed" and, thus, may be entitled to an award under the Statute. Anderson & Karrenberg v.
Jerry Warnick, 289 P.3d 600, 604 (Utah App. 2012) This approach affords the trial court the

flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or neither, parties may be considered to have
prevailed. Id. In furthering the policies behind the S tah1te, it has been stressed that courts should
also base their decisions with equitable and common sense principles. A.K. & R. Fft?iipple
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Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 94 P.3d 270, 277 (Utah 2004); J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud,
116 P .3d 353, 356 (Utah 2005). In fact, the courts should avoid using the Statute if its use would
result in a windfall to the other party. Bilanzich, 160 P.3d at 1047.
Here, Defendant admits that he failed to pay as he agreed and now seeks relief from this
Court on procedural grounds to not honor his previous agreement. If the Court were to award
reasonable fees and costs, Defendant would completely avoid any liability on a legitimate debt
that he incurred in the principal amount of $22,747.30. Furthermore, Plaintiff has asserted the
action on goods merits and in good faith according to the terms of the Agreement. Accordingly,
in the event that Defendant's Motion is granted, he should not also be awarded attorneys' fees
and costs.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendant's Motion be denied
in its entirety.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2013.

Utah ar um er
00
Attorney for PlaintTf
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EXHIBIT 1
Entity Details
(Attached)
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Entity Details: ADVANTA BANK CORP. - Utah Business Search- Utah.gov

Utah Business Search - Details
@

ADVANTA BANK CORP.
Entity Number: 1039490-0142
Company Type: Corporation - Domestic - Profit
Address: 11850 ELECTION RD DRAPER, UT 84020

@

State of Origin: UT
Registered Agent: TOM BILLINGS
Registered Agent Address:

36 S STATE ST STE 1900
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111

Status: Expired
Status: Expired

O

as of 11/03/2010

Status Description: Failure to File Renewal
Employment Verification: Not Registered with Verify Utah

History
@

Registration Date: 07/11/1989
Last Renewed: 05/12/2009

Additional Information
@

NAICS Code: 5221 NAICS Title: 5221-Depository Credit Intermediation

Doing Business As
COLONIAL CREDIT CORP
@

TRIO BANK
SHOR CORP.
VAL CORPORATION

Former Business Names
ADVANTA FINANCIAL CORP.

Refine your search by:
~-

'

, '

. ..
'

• Search by:
• Business Name
• Number
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

https://secure.utah.gov/bes/action/details?entity=1039490-0142
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1/2

4/4/13

Entity Details: FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION - Utah Business Search - Utah.gov

Utah Business Search - Details
FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION
Entity Number: 6151822-0143
Company Type: Corporation - Foreign - Profit
Address: 30955 NORTHWESTERN HWY Farmington Hills, Ml 483342580

State of Origin: Ml
Registered Agent: CT CORPORATION SYSTEM
Registered Agent Address:

1108 E SOUTH UN ION AVE
Midvale, UT 84047

Status: Active
@

Status: Active

as of03/17/2006

Renew By: 03/31/2014
Status Description: Good Standing

The "Good Standing" status represents that a renewal has been filed, within the most recent renewal period, with the
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.
Employment Verification: Not Registered with Verify Utah

History
Registration Date: 03/17/2006
Last Renewed: 01/24/2013

'i)

Additional Information
NAICS Code: 9999 NAICS Title: 9999-Nonclassifiable Establishment

Doing Business As
• '

•

••

(iJ
. • •' ... ' - "' ', .. '. •>·

~- ..•• ,-, •

FEDERATED FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA

Former Business Names
FEDERATED FINANCIAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA

Refine
your search by:
..

~

.,.._,

• Search by:
• Business Name
• Number

<iJ
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EXHIBIT 2
Recent Rulings
(Attached)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

"·L {--~·. . :·.:·

IN AND FOR SALT LAXE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAli

-------------------------------~-?~
~1...::·
FEDERATED CAPITAL CORPORATION
d/b/a FEDERATED FINANCIAL
CORPORATION.OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

DONALD GUINARD d/b/a GUINARD'S
PC CONSULTING LLC,
:

Case No. 129908455
Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN

v.

..

ORDER

=

DATE: March

Pit~~~~-~t:; ·.: · ~:· ·:- -.- _;_· ...

~1 ,

2013

;.••.: ;:. : : .. ..,..r. j

@)

· ·The' above :matter is before the Court on De~endant Donald
Guinard's Motion to Dismiss filed on Augusts, 2012.

The Court,

having c~~efully considered the Motion and relevant ·1aw, hereby
~~

denies tile Motion and rules as follo~s:

Defendant argues that this matter should be dismissed

because it is time barred under Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-307. 1
Code~- ~7-8B._2-307 establishes a four year statute of
limitations··for- -actions. '~upon a contract, ol;:,l_igation, or
......... ,1-••••....... · -........

··- ---· .. ·-·· · - · .......... - ................... .

1

n~~~~~~~t. actually argues that the correct statutory
provision i's 72B-2-J07, which is-clearly in error.

:£.it'

~
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Utah

liability not founded upon an instrument in writing."
Ann. §78B-2-307(l) (a).

Utah Code

However, this matter appears to have been

brought to enforce the obligations under a written contract
between Defendant and Advanta Bank Corp., which Plaintiff alleges
Defendant breached on June 9·, 2006.

As

such, Plaintiff's action

is governed by Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-309{2), which establishes a
six year statute of limitations.

Because this action was filed

on June a, 2012, it appears to be timely.

Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. 2
Thia is the Order of·the Court and no other ord~r is
required.
Dated this

'1-7

day of March, 2013.

URT JUD

2The court's decision in this matter renders moot
Plaintiff's January 28 th Motion to Enlarge Time to File Response
to Motion to Dismiss.
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IN THE THIRD JUDI CIA . DI

fg) ¥'
LI

l(

RICT COURT

FILED DISTRICT C8URl
Third Judicial Distr;ct

MAR 11 2013
SA~( LAKE COUNTY .c-

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAl\1------;r::
08::put:-:..~~,.oiT:ier~k

SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION

FEDERATED CAPITAL
CORPORATION,

DISMISS
Plaintiff,

vs.
ALBERT A. DITIZIO d/b/a ALLIED
OFFICE EQUIPMENT, INC.,

Case No. 0129918131
Judge Vernice S. Trease

Defendant.

Before the court is Defendant's Motion to Dis~ss. Neither party has r~quest~d oral

argument and the court finds that the issues raised in the Motion have been sufficiently briefed in
the memoranda that a decision is appropriate without further hearing. The court having reviewed
and considered Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the parties' memoranda, exhibits, affidavit,.
applicable statutes, rules and case law, denies Defendant's Motion for the reasons discussed

herein.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff> Federated Capital Corporation~ has commenced a debt collection suit against
Defendant, Albert A..Ditizio d/b/a Allied Office Equipment, alleging that as of December 30,

2006 Defendant had a credit card balance of $29,329.29 that has not been paid. Defendant has

filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging several grounds in support thereof.- Defendant alleges that
( 1) this court lacks personal jurisdiction and is an inconvenient forum because Defendant is a .
resident of Maryland and has no contacts with the State of Utah; (2) Plaintiff has failed to name
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proper parties and/or state a claim for which relief may be granted; (3)-the statute of limitations
has run as to counts 2 and 3 of the comp1aint; and (4) count 1 fails as well because Plaintiff has
failed to show a written contract ot a signed card agreement and the statute of limitations has run.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant consented to personal jurisdiction and venue in the
State of Utah through a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause in the Card Agreement,
that the complaint complies with Rule 8, URCP, and does state the proper parties and claims for
which relief may be granted, that under Utah law the Card Agreement did not have to be signed,
and that the statute oflimitations has not expired on any of the claims alleged .. The court will
address each of these issues.

JURISDICTION
On the issue of jurisdiction there are essentially two questions to address: First, is the
forum selection clause contained in the Card Agreement enforceable? And second, if the forum
selection clause enforceable, is there a sufficient rational nexus between the forum selected
and/or consented to, and either the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject
matter of the contract?

· While generally personal jurisdiction is determined by a three-part inquiry,1 the Utah
Supreme Court has determined that in cases involving contractual forum selection/consent-to-

jurisdiction clauses, a different inquiry should be made. Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson,
2000 UT 64, ,r 14. However, before this inquiry can be made, the court must determine whether

1

Generally, t11e test for personal jurisdiction is "(I) the defendant's acts or contacts must
implicate Utah under the Utah long arm statute; (2) a "nexus,, must exist between the plaintiffs claims
and the defendant's acts or contacts; and (3) application of the Utah long-arm statute must satisfy the
requirements of federal due process." Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 112.

-2-
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the forum selection clause itself is enforceable. Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Teton Builders, 2005
UT 4, ,I 11.

l Enforceability ofForum Selection Clause
~

"A prerequisite to determining whether the parties' forum selection clause is enforceable
is discerning which state's law governs the substantive validity of the contract's tenns." Id at ,I
12. Plaintiff has argued, and Defendant does not appear to dispute, that Utah law, is applicable

in this case. Defendant has argued Utah law in his Motion to Dismiss. In addition, the Card
Agreement contains a choice of law provision indicating Utah law is applicable.

In this case, there is no evidence to indicate that Advanta Bank Corporation ("Advanta"),
the original creditor in this case, did not act in good faith or that it was trying to evade the laws of

the State of Maryland. Furthermore, there is a substantial relationship between the transaction
and the agreement; namely, that Advanta was a Utah bank, doing business in Utah from 1989 to
2010. In addition, as discussed below, the agreement is not contrary to Utah's public policy.

In order for the forum selection clause to be enforceable, the clause must ?Ot violate Utah
law or public policy. Jacobsen, 2005 UT 4, ~ 12. Defendant appears to argue that the forum

selection clause violates Utah's long-ann statue as well as the traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice because of his lack of contact with Utah. However, as the Utah Supreme
Court has previously held, a forum selection clause does not need to "rise to the level required
under section 78-27-24 [(recodified as section 78B-3-205 (2008))].'' Phone Directories Co., 2000
UT 64, ~ 14. Thus, this argument is not convincing.
Consequently, because Defendant fails to point to any law or public policy violated by the

forum selection clause, the clause is enforceable. Therefore, the court must next determine
-3-
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whether there is "a sufficiently rational nexus to Utah to justify the exercise of personal

jurisdiction." Jacobsen, 2005 UT 4, ~ 11.

IL Rational Nexus
In order for a court to have personal jurisdiction pursuant to a forum selection clause
there must be a sufficient "rational nexus between the forum selected and/or consented to, and
either the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject matter of the contract."

Jacobsen, 2005 UT 4, ~ 11. While there is a requirement for "some connection between Utah
and either the parties to or the actions contemplated by the contract, it need not rise to the level

required under section 78-27-24 ((recodified as section 78B-3~205 (2008))]." Id.
In Jacobsen, the court held that one party's connection to Utah can be sufficient to satisfy

the rational nexus inquiry. Id at 143. Thus the court held that the trial court had personal
jurisdiction over two Wyoming residents where the plaintiff's primary place of busi11ess was in

Utah and the contract's forum selection clause indicated Utah as the forum for litigation. Id
The case at hand, is similar to Jacobsen. Advanta was a Utah bank doing business in
Utah. And, the Card Agreement indicates Utah as the proper jurisdiction and venue. While
Defendant argues the Utah is an inappropriate forum because he resides in another state that does

not negate the fact thatAdvanta was a Utah bank conducting business in Utah. Thus, because
there is a sufficiently rational nexus between Utah ,and a party, Advanta, jurisdiction and venue in
Utah is proper.
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND Il\1PROPER PARTY
Defendant alleges that the matter should be dismiss because the complaint fails to state a

claim for which relief may be granted. A Motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state
-4-
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a claim upon which relief can be granted, admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges
the plaintiffs right to relief based on those fact. Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah

1995). Under this standard, and accepting the facts alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff has stated
a ciaim upon which relief may be granted.
Regarding Defendant's contention of improperly naming the parties, the Card Agreement

by it's terms and the later billing on the account include both Albert A. Ditizio and Allied Office
Equipment, Inc. The tenns of the Card Agreement holds accountable both the business and the
signing individual. Plaintiff asserts that Albert A. Ditizio is the card applicant and signing
individual.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The applicable statute is UCA 78B-2-309. As discussed herein, the Card Agreement is
the written contract in this case. The six year statute of limitations began to run at the time the
last payment was made on the Account. UCA 78B-2-l l 3. The last payment was made on

December 30, 2006. The complaint was filed on December 28, 2012. At the time of the filing of

the complaint the statute of limitations had not expired.

FAILURE TO PRODUCE A SIGNED AGREEMENT
Defendant also contends that the forum selection clause is not valid because Plaintiff

have failed to produce a signed copy of the Card Agreement. Howevert Utah Code Section 25-54(2){e) provides that

[a] credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature
b.y the party to be charged if: (i) the debtor is provided with a written
copy of the tenns of the agreement; (ii) the agreement provides that
any Qse of the credit offered shall constitute ~cceptance of those
tenns; and (iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the debtor..
~
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. requests funds pursuant to the credit agreement or otherwise uses the
credit offered.
Plaintiff asserts that in 2002., Defendant was approved for a card issued in the name of

Allied Office Equipment Inc., with the signing individual's name being the Defendant. Plaintiff
asserts upon applying, receiving and using the card, Defendant agreed to the terms and conditions
of the Card Agreement. The terms and conditions of the card include acceptance of liability by

the signer. For the purposes of this Motion, the Defendant is a properly named party.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be and hereby is
denied.
Defendant is granted fifteen (15) days from the date of this Memorandum Ruling and

Order to file an answer.
This Memorandum Ruling and Order shall stand as the order of the Court on this matter;

no further order is required.
Dated this J1th day of March, 2013.

-6-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ce11ify that on the 4th day of April, 2013, I transmitted copies of the above
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES

via an approved e-filing service provider to the following:

Lester A. Perry, Esq.
HOOLE & KING
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Defendant(:'>)
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§ 78B-2-103. Action barred in another state barred in Utah
West's Utan Code Annotated

Title 78B. Judicial Code

Credit card agreements

(Approx. 2 pages)

Pleadings
Presumptions

U.C.A. 195:i § 788-2-103
Fom1erly cited as ur ST§ 78-12-45

Right or citizen of this state
Tort actions. generally

§

788-2-103. Action barred in another state barred in Utah
CIIITClllllt'SS

A cause of action which arises in another jurisdiction, and which is not actionable in the other
jurisdiction by reason of the lapse of time. may not be pursued in this state. unless the cause
of action is held by a citizen of this state who has held the cause of action from the time it
accrued.

Credits
Laws 2008. c. 3, § 624, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.

Notes of Decisions (16)
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-2-103, UT ST§ 78B-2-103
Current through 2016 Fourth Special Session.
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Construction contracts
Constniction with federal law

,

Contract actions

Proposed Legislation

Contracts

Effecti\"c: August 19, 2002

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525

Conlraclual statute of limitations
Declaratory judgments
Defenses
Discovery rule

§

5525. Four year limitation

Employment contracts
Equipment leases

Current 111.!ss

Estoppel
Federal actions

~

Foreign judgments. generally

(a) General rule.--Except as provided for in subsection (b). the following actions and
proceedings must be commenced within four years:
( 1) An action upon a contract, under seal or otherwise, for the sale, construction or
furnishing of tangible personal property or fixtures.
(2) Any action subject to 13 Pa.C.S. § 2725 (relating to statute of limitations in contracts

Guaranties
Guaranty
Implied or quasi-contracts
Indemnity
Insurer conduct. tolling
Law governing
Legislation and ordinances

for sale).

Malpractice

(3) An action upon an express contract not founded upon an instrument in writing.

Notes

(4) An action upon a contract implied in law, except an action subject to another limitation

Oral promises to pay

specified in this subchapter.

Pension benefits

Notice

Pleading

(5) An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of any state.
(6) An action upon any official bond of a public official, officer or employee.
(7) An action upon a negotiable or nonnegotiable bond, note or other similar instrument in
writing. Where such an instrument is payable upon demand, the time within which an
action on it must be commenced shall be computed from the later of either demand or any
payment of principal of or interest on the instrument.
(8) An action upon a contract. obligation or liability founded upon a writing not specified in
paragraph (7), under seal or otherwise, except an action subject to another limitation
specified in this subchapter.

Preliminary objections
Preservation of issues for review
Presumption of payment. sealed
instruments
Property settlement agreements
Quantum meruit claims
Repayment of loan
Restitution daims
Sealed instruments
Specialties. sealed instruments
Tolling
Tort and contract actions, tolling

(b) Special provisions.--An action subject to section 8315 (relating to damages in actions for
identity theft) must be commenced within four years of the date of the offense or four years

Uninsured motorist insurance
Validity

from the date of the discovery of the identity theft by the plaintiff.

Credits
1976, July 9, 1-'.l. 586, No.142, § 2, effective June 27. 1978. Amended 1980, Oct. 5, P.L.
693, No. 142,

§ 501(a), effective in 60 days: 1982, Dec. 20, P.L. 1409, No. 326, art. 11, § 201,

effective in 60 days; 2002, June 19, P.L. 430, No. 62, § 2, effective in 60 days.

~

Editors' Notes
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMENT
Source Note: Patterned after act of April 6, 1953 (P.L. 3), § 2-725 {12A P.S. §
2-725).
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